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INTRODUCTION
If heath policy makers' wishes come true, by the end of the current dec-
ade the paper charts in which most of our medical information is currently
recorded will be replaced by networked electronic health records ("EHRs").
Integrated, longitudinal EHRs will help doctors coordinate care across time
and across specialties, enable patients and those who treat them to access
relevant information wherever it is needed, and facilitate the creation of
population health data that can be used to improve the health of all.' Alt-
hough EHRs represent a substantial improvement over fragmented,
geographically dispersed, illegible, and uncoordinated paper records, they
pose new dangers as well. Like all computerized records, networked EHRs
are difficult to secure, and the information in EHRs is both particularly sen-
sitive and particularly valuable for commercial purposes. Sadly, the existing
* I. Herman Stem Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
Thanks to Alice Abreu, Rob Bartow, Richard Baron, Julie Cohen, Craig Green, Rick Green-
stein, Dave Hoffman, Sharona Hoffman, Gregory Mandel, Andrea Monroe, David Post, Mark
Rothstein, Henry Smith, Sandra Sperino, and Nicolas Terry for comments on earlier drafts.
Thanks also to Meghan Kenney and Olivia Jolly for research assistance. All errors are mine.
I. See infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text.
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federal statute meant to address this problem, the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),2 is probably inadequate to
the task. Thus, the information in EHRs is as vulnerable as it is valuable.
Although medical information is in several ways distinctive, in many
important respects such information is but a subset of "information" more
generally, and the problems raised by EHRs instantiate a larger set of prob-
lems posed by the collection of information about individuals in
cyberspace.' As is now well known, our digital trails allow the technologi-
cally sophisticated to assemble an uncannily accurate picture of our
preferences, interests, economic status, political views, and consumption
patterns. Sometimes the use of this picture can be beneficial, helping us get
what we want more quickly and in more tailored ways, but, as is the case
with medical information, the data collected about us can be dangerous. It
can be used to deny us jobs or credit, to embarrass us, or to harass us.'
Health law, privacy, and intellectual property scholars have all suggest-
ed that the river of information created by integrated, networked EHRs and
other data systems must somehow be controlled,' and many of these schol-
ars have considered whether "property" might provide such control.' If
2. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.);
see also HIPAA Security Rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-.318 (201 1)(specifically § 164.306,
security measures generally; § 164.308, administrative safeguards; § 164.310, physical safe-
guards; § 164.312, technical safeguards; § 164.314, organizational requirements; and
§ 164.316, policies and procedures and documentation requirements).
3. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
4. As is developed infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text, medical information is
meaningfully different from personal information collected in cyberspace, if for no other rea-
son than that medical information is "confidential" and therefore subject to special duties that
do not apply to other information. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 2:6 (2011). But to the
extent that even "confidential" information is only imperfectly protected, it shares many fea-
tures in common with "ordinary," non-confidential personal information.
As a general matter, it is important to distinguish between "deidentified" information on
the one hand and information that can be linked directly to an individual on the other.
Deidentified information is "information that has been altered to remove certain data elements
associated with an individual." Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect
Health Privacy in Research?, 10 Am. J. BIOETHICS 3, 3 (2010). Deidentified information pos-
es fewer risks for individuals than identified information. Id.
5. For two vivid accounts of the general process of data collection, see DANIEL
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 13-26 (2004), and Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyber-
space Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1198-99 (1998).
6. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1134
(2011) (describing privacy harms as "the loss of control over information about oneself or
one's attributes"); Julie E Cohen, Examined Lives: Infornational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1379 (2000) ("Data privacy advocates seek . . . to guarantee
individuals control over their personal data."); Jessica Litman, Informiation Priva-
cy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2000) ("[Alctual control [of
information] seems unattainable.").
7. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Elec-
tronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REv. 631 (2010) (suggesting that patients be allowed to
license rights to medical information for purposes of stimulating market development of
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individuals had property rights in the information collected about them, then
arguably that information could not be used without their consent.' Thus,
some assert that by granting individuals property rights in the medical and
other information collected about them, the law can prevent the more dysto-
pian consequences of our wired world.'
The notion that property might help solve the problem of uncontrolled
information was the subject of intense consideration over a decade ago,"o but
then interest somewhat waned. Increasing use of and support for EHRs has
recently generated new proposals for the propertization of health infor-
mation.11 I leave to others the question whether these proposals adequately
address the health and other assorted public policy issues raised by EHRs.12
This Article focuses instead on whether the sophisticated, qualified owner-
ship regimes scholars have propounded are appropriately characterized as
"property" at all.
The Article's principal thesis is that arguments over the control of rights
in personal information test contemporary understandings of what property
is and reveal fault lines in modern property theory. If property rights exist at
EHRs); Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54
HASTINGs L.J. 899 (2003) (exploring the possible costs and benefits of a regime of "muddy
property rules" for personal information); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004) (proposing a five-element model for propertized per-
sonal information).
These proposals are by no means uncontroversial. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado
About Data Ownership, 25 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 69 (arguing that property rights might merely
replicate the unsatisfying framework of patient protections already available under HIPAA);
Marc A. Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 86,
87 (2009) (arguing that property rights create a danger of an anti-commons that could make
the cost of collecting population health data prohibitive); see also Cohen, supra note 6, at
1391; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1136-46
(2000) (challenging the effectiveness of a property regime).
8. Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy: Regulating Uses of Personal Data in
the Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REv. 751, 771 (1999) (book review) ("Propertiz-
ing personal information would ... give members of the public some control, which they
currently lack, over the traffic in personal data."). But see id. at 772 (expressing reservations
about this proposal). To use the famous Calabresi and Melamud formulation, personal infor-
mation would be protected by a "property" rather than a "liability" rule. See infra notes 60-62
and accompanying text for the development of this idea.
9. Of course, "property" is not the only legal device by which information might be
controlled. Intellectual property, privacy, contract, and tort represent other possibilities. On
these alternatives, see infra notes 59 and 66.
10. See Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 987 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 7; see also Edmund Haislmaier, Health Care Information
Technology: Getting the Policy Right, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 16, 2006),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/06/health-care-information-technology-getting-
the-policy-right.
12. For a description of the wide range of these issues, see infra Part III.A.
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all in "dephysicalized,"13 digitized information, those rights are unlikely to
be consolidated in a single person, to operate in rem, to grant owners signif-
icant powers to exclude, or to be standardized-qualities that, in the eyes of
some, are required of true "property" interests. Claims of ownership to per-
sonal information also raise questions about whether property is the right
rhetorical frame in which to consider the problem of information that is
deeply connected to people's selves. Finally, propertization claims assume a
closer connection between property and control than is either realistic or
desirable in an interconnected world. It is likely that, at the end of the day,
individuals will as a matter of policy be granted some rights to control some
of their personal information, but those rights will not follow from anything
in property's "nature."
Part I introduces the control issues raised by EHRs specifically and by
the collection of personal information more generally, and then examines
the arguments for using property as a device to control information. Discus-
sions of property-as-control tend to adopt an excessively thin notion of
property, focused on alienability. While under traditional property principles
alienability is valued highly and restraints on alienation are disfavored, in
the case of information, alienability is almost always seen as problematic.'
To solve this problem, we could customize the alienability of property rights
in personal information in ways that maximize individuals' powers of control
while minimizing economic and moral dangers. But the rights produced by
such customization might not look all that much like property rights. Tailored,
customized rights will not easily be standardized and may thus fail to convey
the information that some property theorists regard as essential to a working
property system. To the extent that individuals might hold relation-specific
"bundles of rights" against different parties in the information chain, their
rights would lack the in rem quality that some believe distinguishes property
from other legal rights. The debates over whether information property pro-
vides control thus test extant definitions of property.
Part II explores the connection between the loss of control over infor-
mation and concerns about the "self." It questions whether property is the
best frame in which to talk about medical and other personal information,
i.e., whether, rhetorically, we should treat information about the self as a
commodity. It questions also whether we can avoid a property frame. If
commodification of the self is troubling, transferring the propertied self
from invisible, commercial data aggregators to visible, embodied individu-
als does not solve the problem. But, I argue, when we see others employing
13. On the transition from "physicalist" to "de-physicalized" notions of property be-
ginning in the nineteenth century, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 1870-1960 145-56 (1992).
14. As is explained infra text accompanying notes 70-72, those who have examined
propertization claims have argued that information asymmetries will lead individuals to trade
their rights away and to do so without awareness of what might happen to the information
after the first trade is made.
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"our" ATM withdrawals, E-ZPass-recorded drives, website visits, and the
like for commercial purposes, our perspective easily shifts, and we begin to
see "our" data as "our" property. This step is neither logical nor required. It
is property protection that makes an asset valuable; value derives from prop-
erty protection rather than the other way around. It is worth exploring why it
is so easy to lose sight of this important fact. To explore this problem and
the issue of commodification more generally, I revisit an older case involv-
ing potential property rights in human tissue, Moore v. Regents of
California." Although Moore does not deal directly with rights to infor-
mation, the opinions in Moore reveal how even judges holding the same
view of the moral stakes in self-commodification can reach diametrically
different conclusions about what to do in the face of the changes wrought by
technology. The opinions also illustrate the allure of envy-based claims, as it
was only after others revealed the value of the patient-plaintiff's tissue that
the patient claimed property rights in his excised cells. Several justices
would have recognized those claims.16
Part III returns to the specific policy problems presented by EHRs and
by personal information. A workable EHR policy will take account of a
wide variety of values, issues, and interests. Incentives must be created to
facilitate EHR adoption, standards must be set to insure interoperability,
malpractice rules must be adjusted to accommodate new practices (not to
mention new mistakes), and procedures must be developed to enable use of
EHR data for public health purposes. With respect to personal information
more generally, complex considerations of confidentiality, efficiency, and
national security, just to name a few, will all come into play. In the context
of both EHRs and personal information more broadly, the multitude of is-
sues presented is likely to be resolved by statutes or regulations that will
address in detail the difficult policy questions raised. But because "property"
means such different things to different people, it is not clear how much
guidance property theory can provide to lawmakers about the appropriate
mix or balance of private and public interests in information. Claims for
control through propertization of information often rely on a thin Blacksto-
nian "despotic dominion" vision of property that, despite a commonsensical
appeal, ignores the many ways in which contemporary property law limits
owners' freedom. Just as it is untrue that where there is value there must be
property, it is also untrue that where there is property, owners will gain un-
fettered powers of control. A workable policy for EHRs and for personal
information will no doubt provide individuals some control rights. These
15. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
16. As is developed infra note 215, deceit may also play a role in making property
frames more salient. For a particularly affecting account of this phenomenon, see REBECCA
SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010), describing a family's reaction to
learning that cells taken without consent from a relative had been made into one of the most
important and frequently used cell lines in medicine, without a penny of compensation to the
patient or any of the members of her family.
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rights might look, in the eyes of some, like property rights. But if control
rights are granted, it will not be because "property" demands them, but be-
cause other considerations of health and public policy do.
All this raises the question of when and whether property might ever
provide the control that advocates of information-as-property desire. In a
world of de-physicalization and digitization, ownership may not provide the
kind of power that old-fashioned property rhetoric invokes. This state of
affairs is not necessarily one to be lamented. The question of how power and
control over information will be apportioned involves hard choices. But be-
cause property theory is itself deeply divided over the extent to which
property provides control, "property" itself cannot determine how these
choices should be made. "Property" may never have actually given owners
as much control as the new adherents of property in information envision.
Even if it did, in a world of increasing interconnection, it may be good to be
reminded that power and control are themselves always shared.
I. THE NEED TO CONTROL INFORMATION
Section A of this Part surveys briefly how EHRs work and how they can
improve the quality of health care. There is much to be said about EHRs as a
matter of medical, fiscal, and public health policy, but my focus in this sec-
tion is how the digitization of medical information in EHRs-the very
feature that makes EHRs superior to older, paper records-raises security
risks quite different from, and more serious than, those posed by paper
charts. While HIPAA purports to address these security problems, few be-
lieve that HIPAA is adequate to the task. Thus, medical information, like
other information collected about users in cyberspace, is insecure, and that
insecurity has led to calls for control.
Section B of this Part describes the proposal that property be used to
solve the problem of information control. Arguments for property rights in
personal information assert that such rights will give individuals a veto
power over unwanted uses. As skeptics have observed, however, fully alien-
able rights may just replicate, and not solve, the security problem, for a
variety of forces may conspire to pressure owners to trade their rights away.
We could adjust or limit the alienability of such rights to compensate for
these forces, but the resulting powers retained by owners might not have the
consolidated, in rem qualities that, in the eyes of some property theorists,
make property distinct. Proposals for propertization of information thus ex-
pose fractures in contemporary understandings of how property functions.
Section C of this Part examines whether the venerable "bundle of
rights" metaphor for property might or might not fit propertized rights in
information. A fully integrated, networked system of EHRs will require lots
of customized rights, tweaked between and among various participants in
the system. Such customization makes the bundle of rights metaphor seem
[Vol. 18:367
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apt. At some point, however, under a regime of customization one wonders
whether owners will retain robust powers of exclusion or whether their
rights will be meaningfully standardized. Since some property theorists con-
sider exclusion and standardization to be core features of property,
customization, like alienation, raises the question of how "property" should
be defined.
A. EHRs and Information Control
The medical record of the past was a paper chart.17 Such records are dif-
ficult to organize and often illegible. The file in one health provider's office
is unlikely to be connected in any way to files in other health providers' of-
fices, impeding coordination of care. Frequently, paper records cannot be
retrieved in a timely fashion.' 8 For these reasons, among others, the medical
record of the future will be digital, an electronic health record. Adoption of
EHRs has been a priority of prestigious nonpartisan policy organizations
such as the Institute of Medicine, as well as of both Republican and Demo-
cratic presidential administrations.'
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of an EHR,20 but the compo-
nents are well understood. An EHR comprises "electronic documentation of
17. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Infor-
mation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997) (describing the paper medical record as "a relic from
another era").
18. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. MED., CROSSING THE QUALI-
TY CHASM 15 (2001) ("[F]or most individuals . . . health information is dispersed in a
collection of paper records that are poorly organized and often illegible, and frequently cannot
be retrieved in a timely fashion, making it nearly impossible to manage many forms of chronic
illness."); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 457 (1995) (explaining that paper records "are fragmented, poorly documented and du-
plicative; they are often not accurate, complete, timely, or accessible when needed for patient
care").
19. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 18, at 17 (recommending
a "national commitment to building an information infrastructure" and to "the elimination of
most handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade"). The Bush administration set the
goal of making EHRs available to most Americans by 2014. See Mike Allen, Bush Touts Plan
for Electronic Medicine: Campaign Aimed at 'Wired' Voters, WASH. POST, May 28, 2004, at
A8; Bernard Wysocki Jr., Electronic Health Records Get a Push, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004,
at D4. The Obama administration apportioned twenty-seven billion dollars over ten years to
fund EHR development. See David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The 'Meaningful Use'
Regulation for Electronic Health Records, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501 (2010); Robert Pear,
New Rules on Electronic Health Records, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A16; see also David
Brown, Obama Pledges New Data System for Veterans, WASH. POsT, Apr. 10, 2009, at A2
(describing EHRs as key feature of Obama's health-care reform plans).
20. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation
and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV.. .L. & TECH. 104, 108 (2008)
("No universally accepted definitions have been developed for 'EHRs' or 'EHR systems.'").
There is now one statutory definition, contained in the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which was signed into law as a part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009:
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providers' notes, electronic viewing of laboratory and radiological results,
e-prescribing, and an interoperable connection via a health information
exchange with all other providers and hospitals in a community."2 Inter-
connection is a non-trivial component of EHRs because of network
effects: "The more providers that are connected, the more comprehensive
and useful the medical information is for any single patient."22
EHRs have the potential to improve the safety, quality, and efficiency of
care.2 1 With respect to safety, for example, EHR systems have the capacity
to reduce prescribing errors by flagging erroneously entered orders, noting
drug allergies, and alerting health care providers to potentially problematic
drug interactions. 24 With respect to quality, EHRs contain reminder systems
for preventative care such as vaccinations or screening; they facilitate man-
agement of chronic conditions over time (by tracking past and present
laboratory test results) and across providers (by providing information to
multiple specialists who can better coordinate care);25 and they contain deci-
sion support features linking providers to information on best practices and
Qualified electronic health record-The term 'qualified electronic health record'
means an electronic record of health-related information on an individual that-
(A) includes patient demographic and clinical health information, such as medical
history and problem lists; and
(B) has the capacity-
(i) to provide clinical decision support;
(ii) to support physician order entry;
(iii) to capture and query information relevant to health care quality; and
(iv) to exchange electronic health information with, and integrate such infor-
mation from other sources.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj (West 2011); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat 115 (2009).
21. CONG. BUDGET OFF., EVIDENCE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH INFOR-
MATION TECHNOLOGY, Pub. No. 2976, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9168/05-20-healthit.pdf. The Health Information Man-
agement Systems Society defines an EHR as follows:
The Electronic Health Record (EHR) is a longitudinal electronic record of patient
health information generated by one or more encounters in any care delivery set-
ting. Included in this information are patient demographics, progress notes,
problems, medications, vital signs, past medical history, immunizations, laboratory
data, and radiology reports.
Electronic Health Record, HEALTH INFO. & MGMT. Sys. Soc'Y (2006),
http://www.himss.org/ASP/topicsehr.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
22. Hall, supra note 7, at 638.
23. Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 19, at 503.
24. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 20, at 114; CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 21,
at 14.
25. COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR PATIENT SAFETY, INST. MED., LETTER REPORT:
KEY CAPABILITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM 2 (2003) [hereinafter LET-
TER REPORT]; Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 20, at 112.
new treatments. 26 With respect to efficiency, EHRs reduce the number of
repetitive and unnecessary tests.27 This list just scratches the surface of pos-
sible advantages.28 In addition to improvements to the care of individual
patients, EHRs can also promote public health by, inter alia, enabling the
collection of evidence on the efficacy of treatment alternatives and providing
a wide array of data to public health officials. 29
Individuals' medical information is of interest to a large number of enti-
ties, from insurance companies to employers to marketing firms seeking to
sell medical equipment or drugs.30 This is true of information about relative-
ly unremarkable conditions, such as hypertension or acne, and certainly no
less true about conditions such as HIV, depression, or sexual dysfunction.31
Of course, some entities might use information about an individual's health
status in ways the individual might find beneficial, such as offering pro-
grams geared toward helping people to lose weight, stop smoking, or cope
with stress. But many entities might use the same information in ways the
individual might deem harmful-to deny employment or insurance, or to
stigmatize or embarrass. 32
26. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 20, at 113-16; LETTER REPORT, supra note 25,
at 8.
27. LETTER REPORT, supra note 25, at 5-6.
28. Other advantages of EHRs over paper records include speeding responses to ab-
normal test results, id. at 7; improved communication with patients, id. at 9; and enhanced
"searchability," see Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confiden-
tiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683 (2007).
29. See generally Rodwin, supra note 7 (describing public health uses of the infor-
mation in EHRs); Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36
Am. J.L. & MED. 586 (2010) (describing similar uses). Ideally, information provided to public
health officials would be deidentified. For more on deidentification, see infra notes 42-46 and
accompanying text.
30. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Pro-
tecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REv. 331, 334-35
(2007) (describing the range of entities that would find health information useful).
31. Gostin, supra note 18, at 454 ("Health information is perhaps the most intimate,
personal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an individual.").
32. As Lawrence Gostin has explained:
Unauthorized access to personal information can be motivated by many factors.
These include profiting from the sale of data to information brokers or marketing
firms; uncovering sensitive information about famous individuals such as a history
of mental illness, HIV infection, or a sexually transmitted disease; possessing in-
formation that may be helpful in litigation such as malpractice actions; and using
the information to make employment or insurance decisions.
Id. at 487; see also id. at 490 (unwanted disclosures may result in economic harms such as
loss of employment, insurance, or housing; in social or psychological harm; or in stigmatiza-
tion).
Congress has responded to this possibility in the case of genetic information. The Genet-
ic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 was enacted on May 21, 2008, to "protect
Americans against discrimination based on their genetic information when it comes to health
insurance and employment." Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 USC).
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Unfortunately, the more thorough, integrated, and networked the EHR,
the more information it contains, and the greater the risk to the individual
from its unauthorized disclosure.3 3 While a paper chart can be secured simp-
ly by placing it in a locked room,' securing the information in an EHR is
not so easy. For one thing, the number of authorized users of an EHR may
be very large; many individuals and entities need to be controlled.3 5 For an-
other thing, there are powerful commercial reasons for seeking unauthorized
access to medical information, and such unauthorized access may not be
illegal.3 1 In addition, computer networks can be breached or hacked, com-
puters containing personal information can be stolen, and information can
be disclosed inadvertently.3 1 Within a fully interoperable health information
network, "EHRs could be accessed from anywhere in the country and
transmitted illicitly across the world quickly, cheaply, and with little risk of
detection."38
Of course, medical information is subject to duties of confidentiality."
However, these duties protect patients only incompletely. Confidentiality
attaches to information provided in the course of the physician-patient rela-
tionship, but much information in EHRs involves either other health care
professionals, who may not be subject to confidentiality duties, or involves
other entities, such as insurers or employers, who clearly are not subject to
For a discussion of this statute, see Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 597 (2011).
33. Nicolas Terry explains this problem as follows:
The patient data contained in modern longitudinal systems is comprehensive, port-
able, and manipulable. The potential for abuse is immense; there are many parties
(pharmaceutical companies and government being the obvious examples, inquisi-
tive healthcare employees being the most commonly reported) that crave access to
this data. As a result, the privacy and confidentiality costs potentially incurred by
patients rise exponentially.
Nicolas P. Terry, What's Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 23
(2009).
34. Gostin, supra note 18, at 493-94 ("Manual records are often maintained by the
health care provider in secure locations .... The cumbersome nature of manual records makes
it an arduous task to acquire, copy, and use them.... By contrast, computerization makes it
easy to enter, transmit, copy, or delete vast amounts of data."); Terry & Francis, supra note
28, at 705 ("In order to gain access to paper records, someone must be physically present with
the record. Inadvertent release of records and computer hacking are notorious problems with
other electronic records."). Securing physical records does not guarantee control of the infor-
mation therein, as doctors might, for example, discuss a patient in a hospital hallway or
elevator. On existing legal distinctions between physical patient records and the information
contained therein, see infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
35. Gostin, supra note 18, at 485-86.
36. Id. at 487.
37. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 30, at 332-33; see also Kevin Sack, Patient
Data Landed Online After a Series of Missteps, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2011, at A16 (describing
inadvertent disclosure of patient information).
38. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 20, at 121.
39. Gostin, supra note 18, at 508.
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these duties at common law.40 Uncertainty about the extent to which
disclosures will be protected may deter patients from revealing sensitive
information, resulting in the patients receiving sub-optimal care.4
The security provisions of HIPAA attempt to respond to this problem.
The statute and regulations promulgated under it require that "covered enti-
ties" ensure the confidentiality of electronic health information, protect the
data against foreseeable threats to security, and safeguard against impermis-
sible use. 42 Yet many commentators believe that HIPAA will not in fact
solve the problem of patient confidentiality. A number of complaints have
been raised about HIPAA. First, it does not apply to a broad range of actors,
from websites to employers, who may possess sensitive health infor-
mation.43 Where it does apply, it provides too much discretion to "covered
entities" to decide how to implement security standards." Lastly, it fails to
provide a private right of action for unauthorized disclosures.45 As one
commentator summarizes the problem, "the privacy architecture seems
backwards; it concentrates almost exclusively on the process of patient con-
sent to disclosure." 46
If HIPAA and its accompanying regulations are indeed flawed, then, de-
spite its nominal confidentiality, medical information is not in fact as secure
as most people expect. If this is true, then-again despite its nominal confi-
dentiality-medical information is appropriately conceptualized as but a
subset of the personal information collected about individuals in today's
networked world. The dystopia of ubiquitous information collection and
40. Id. at 512; Terry, supra note 33, at 18 ("A concept of privacy-confidentiality pro-
tection that is bound to an outdated conception of the confidence inherent in a single
physician-patient relationship was bound to fail when the physician-patient relationship was
replaced by fragmented care."); see also Mark A. Rothstein, The Hippocratic Bargain and
Health Information Technology, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 7, 8 (2010) (asserting that the physi-
cian is no longer the "sole provider of health care" but shares responsibility with, inter alia,
pharmacists, dentists, and laboratory technicians; "the addition of all these individuals and
entities into what was once a simple, two-party, physician-patient relationship has completely
changed the original privacy 'bargain' ").
If insurers or employers are "covered entities" under HIPAA, they will be subject to
statutory duties to secure patient information. On the limits of HIPAA, see infra text accom-
panying notes 43-46.
41. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 30, at 335 (describing a survey in which some
respondents claimed that to protect their own privacy, they avoided medical tests or physician
visits); Rothstein, supra note 40, at 9; Schwartz, supra note 17, at 22.
42. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 30, at 339.
43. Id. at 344.
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id. at 354; Terry, supra note 33, at 7.
46. Terry, supra note 33, at 30; see also Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and
HIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1497, 1504-04 (2002) (citing
HIPAA's costs, complexity, and internal inconsistencies); Terry & Francis, supra note 28, at
715. For purposes of this Article, I assume that the critiques of HIPAA are well-founded.
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secret information flows has been described many times. 47 It is now more or
less common knowledge that information about each of us has been collect-
ed in numerous public and private databases; additional information is
obtained by the surreptitious tracking of our every move in cyberspace. On a
server somewhere are detailed records of our interests, politics, reading hab-
its, professions, ages, incomes, travel, sexual proclivities-no aspect of our
lives is unscrutinized. These records, compiled without our knowledge by
entities we do not see or know, are traded, sold, and deployed without our
permission. While we may find some uses of this information beneficial,
such as when our purchase histories become the basis for recommending
books we enjoy,48 there are many potential uses we rightly fear, such as
when recorded (but not always verified)49 indiscretions become the basis for
a denying jobs, credit, or insurance.o More generally, the massive collection
of personal information "creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for
free choice: the more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to
force his obedience."' The specter of constant scrutiny may discourage in-
dividuals from testing new behaviors, ideas, or associations.5 2 Just as
concern about potential later disclosures may deter patients from confiding
in their doctors, concern about misuse or misperception of personal infor-
mation may stifle independent thinking and the experimentation necessary
for self-development. 3
As with HIPAA in the context of medical information, there are federal
statutes addressing some of these problems.54 But, as is the case with
47. In addition to the sources cited supra note 5, see Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1621-
32 (describing "The Privacy Horror Show").
48. SOLOVE, supra note 5, at 23.
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. at 2; Schwartz, supra note 17, at 22-33.
51. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REv. 553, 560 (1995).
52. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609,
1656-57 (describing the phenomenon of "cyber-Thought Police" and arguing that if Internet
users "gain a sense that their every mouse click and key stroke might be observed, the neces-
sary insulation for individual self-determination will vanish").
53. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Power: The Information Society from an
Antihumanist Perspective 9, in THE GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION 232 (Eddan Katz &
Ramesh Subramanian eds., 2011) ("Increasingly, software architectures and information net-
works direct, block, filter, categorize, monitor and normalize behavior: they drive the pace
and possibilities of human interaction, the scope of human imagination, and the search for and
realization of human desires."). For more on self-development, see infra text accompanying
notes 141-145.
54. For a listing of federal statutes passed since 1970, see DANIEL J. SoLOVE & PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, 36-38 (2d ed. 2009). Examples include Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(records from children under age 13 gathered by Internet websites); Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 and 20 U.S.C. §§ 9701-
9708 (amends Fair Credit Reporting Act and provides additional protections against identity
theft); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711
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HIPAA, most commentators regard these statutes as inadequate in a multi-
tude of ways. They reach only a fraction of the information collected about
us-our video rental records, for example-and only a fraction of the col-
lectors of that information." Common law causes of action by no means fill
these gaps.56
If, like HIPAA, the patchwork of federal and state laws pertaining to in-
formation is indeed but a patchwork, then there is little to retard the flow of
personal information. The law does not ensure that individuals will control
the personal data collected about them.57 Since out-of-control information
can be so dangerous, it seems logical to search for a legal device that will
provide individuals with at least some of the desired control. Property is one
possibility; if individuals are deemed to own their personal information,
then they can decide for themselves how that information will be used.58 It is
to these arguments about property that I now turn. 9
(videotape rental information); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221 note, 1232g (school records); Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (records maintained by cable companies).
55. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1444 (2001) ("[F]ederal statutes cover only a
small geography of the database problem. They form a complicated patchwork of regulation
with significant gaps and omissions. For example, federal regulation... does not cover most
records maintained by state and local officials, as well as a host of other records held by li-
braries, charities, and merchants (i.e., supermarkets, department stores, mail order catalogs,
bookstores, and the like)."); see also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 37-38 (listing
federal statutes mandating the collection of sensitive personal information in contrast to the
statutes protecting that information).
56. Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Fed-
eral Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 325, 331 (2002) (explaining
that inability of plaintiffs to meet "highly offensive" standard for invasion of privacy based on
unreasonable public disclosure of private facts often leaves them no remedy for harm); Neil
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV.
1887, 1923 (2010) (arguing that privacy torts are insufficient to address modem privacy prob-
lems because rigid causes of action force harm to fit standards not tailored to modem privacy
needs); see also Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1632 ("Legal protection of personal information
on the Internet is generally limited and often incoherent."). '
57. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 1379 ("Data privacy advocates seek ... to guaran-
tee individuals control over their personal data."); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 245 (2007) ("Control of [data] flows has assumed paramount im-
portance in the interlinked realms of intellectual property and privacy."); Kang, supra note 5,
at 1205 ("[I]nformation privacy is 'an individual's claim to control the terms under which
personal information ... is acquired, disclosed, and used.'"); Schwartz, supra note 52, at
1659 ("From the age of computer mainframes in the 1960s to the current reign of the Inter-
net's decentralized networks, academics and the law have gravitated towards the idea of
privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's data.").
58. Samuelson, supra note 8, at 771-72 (suggesting that "propertizing personal infor-
mation" simply extends the large, existing market for information in personal data in a way
that grants individuals control, but noting also that commodification of personal data may
offend those "who embrace a civil rights concept of data privacy").
59. As noted earlier, property is obviously not the only legal category that could apply.
See supra note 9. One obvious alternative is "intellectual property," the (largely) statutory
system of patent, copyright and trademark. But, as is developed later, the "fit" between IP and
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B. Can Property Solve the Problem of Information Control?
The simplest argument for property rights in personal information is
based on Calabresi and Melamed's famous distinction between property and
liability rules.'o In this scheme, property rules give individuals veto rights
over the use of assets, while liability rules permit unconsented-to uses of
those assets, requiring only payment of damages for any loss suffered as a
result of that use. Or, as Lawrence Lessig has explained in arguing for prop-
erty rights in personal information, "a property regime requires negotiation
before taking; a liability regime allows a taking, and payment later."6' Be-
cause a property rule would bar use of personal information without prior
negotiation, it provides exactly the sort of control that has been sought to
counteract the dystopia of ubiquitous-but-secret information flows. Lessig
justifies the call to property rights in exactly these terms: "The key to a
property regime is to give control, and power, to the person holding the
property right."62
In a world of propertized information, it will be up to each individual to
decide for himself or herself whether-and at what price-to trade his or
her personal information. 63 Granting individuals property rights in their per-
information assets is messy. See infra note 66. In any event, the Supreme Court has held that
raw data-facts-are not protected by intellectual property law. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Another legal category that might appear to provide a means of controlling information
is "privacy." As a legal category, however, privacy is a pretty slippery fish. Privacy's core
principles and their reach are much disputed. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRI-
VACY 1 (2008) (describing privacy as "a concept in disarray"). I take no position on these
disputes here. I note only that, with respect to personal information, many scholars conceptu-
alize privacy as the problem, not the solution. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 5, at 1201, 1267-73
(proposing a "Cyberspace Privacy Act").
Contract and tort are other obvious possibilities. Contract principles would, of course, be
parasitic on property; one can only bargain with what one owns. On contract, see Kang, supra
note 5, at 1246-48 (exploring the possibility that individuals could bargain for the level of
data secrecy they desire, but noting that "for numerous reasons, such as transaction costs,
individuals and information collectors do not generally negotiate and conclude express priva-
cy contracts before engaging in each and every cyberspace transaction"). On tort, see Litman,
supra note 6, at 1308-09 (suggesting that uses of information to which individuals have not
consented can plausibly be seen as breaches of trust, but acknowledging that this theory re-
quires an extension of existing doctrine to cover entities not usually considered to owe duties
of confidentiality to individuals). I leave to others with greater expertise the task of examining
whether and how contract or tort solutions might work.
60. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
61. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999). For an
argument that Lessig misapplies the Calabresi/Melamed framework, see Paul M. Schwartz,
Beyond Lessig's Code fior Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair
Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 743, 77-76.
62. LESSIG, supra note 61, at 160.
63. Id. at 161; see also Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 36 COMM. OF THE
ACM 92, 93 (1996) ("[T]o ensure the protection of individual privacy beyond 2000 we should
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sonal information might allow them, it is argued, to "capture some of the
value their data have in the marketplace."' The need to account for those
rights might affect the behavior of the firms that currently collect data: "per-
haps firms would collect or process less personal data than they currently do
if they had to pay individuals for rights to do so."65 The propertization ar-
gument asserts, in other words, that giving individuals property rights in
their personal information may result in less unwanted, secret collection of
such information.
Since personal information is not protected by existing intellectual
property law,66 if personal information is to be protected as property, it will
be protected as ordinary property, under ordinary, not intellectual, property
principles. But at least some ordinary property principles could be problem-
atic in the case of personal information. One that is seen as particularly
troublesome is the principle of free alienability. As a general rule, applicable
in ordinary circumstances, property is indeed freely alienable, and the law is
hostile to many alienation restraints.67 Property's alienability is thought to
be socially beneficial because it enables welfare-enhancing trades that move
assets to the users who value them most highly.68 But many commentators
predict that the free trade in personal information enabled by propertization
will lead to lesser, rather than greater, control by the individuals to whom
the information pertains. 69 If individuals have property rights to personal
information, those individuals will determine as an initial matter whether to
sell that information for money or barter it for services such as access to a
website. 70 But they will not be able to determine the use made of that infor-
mation once it is in the hands of another; after the individual trades the
consider market-based mechanisms based on individual ownership of personal information
and a National Information Market.").
64. Samuelson, supra note 7, at 1129.
65. Id. at 1133.
66. The personal information of concern here does not quite fit any of the existing IP
categories, as it involves no invention or innovation that would make it patentable, it lacks the
originality and creativity that would make it eligible for copyright protection, and it is not the
sort of secret business information that would make it a trade secret. IP scholars have argued,
in addition, that the incentives that the IP system provides are unnecessary. As one commenta-
tor explains, "Intellectual products have strong public good characteristics, and (at least in
theory) would be underproduced without the additional incentives that intellectual property
provides." Cohen, supra note 6, at 1387; see also J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intel-
lectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REv. 49, 165 (1997) (arguing that classical IP
laws are meant to stimulate forms of creative endeavor that would not be developed without
the institution of exclusive property rights). However, "incentives play little role in the analy-
sis [of personally-identified data]; personally-identified data is not scarce." Cohen, supra note
6, at 1387. For similar arguments, see Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1545, 1550 (2000); Samuelson, supra note 7, at 1139-41.
67. JOSEPH1 WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 278-80 (3d ed. 2010)
68. Id. at 279.
69. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 1391 ("Recognizing property rights in personally-
identified data risks enabling more, not less, trade and producing less, not more, privacy.").
70. Litman, supra note 6, at 1299-30.
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information away, it is freely alienable by the buyer for uses of which the
individual seller may disapprove.' This problem is enhanced by information
asymmetries between information sellers and information buyers; individu-
als rarely understand the kind and range of uses that might later be made of
the information they are selling. 72 In the context of personal information,
alienability, ordinarily thought to be welfare-enhancing, becomes something
more like a trap for the unwary.
Of course, many of these arguments against propertization assume that
if something is "property," then it must be fully and completely alienable. 73
This assumption is, it has been noted, somewhat simplistic. 74 Many valuable
assets that are commonly regarded as property are not, in fact, fully aliena-
ble-social security and pension benefits are easy examples. 75 Moreover,
"alienability is not a binary switch to be turned on or off, but rather a dimen-
sion of property ownership that can be adjusted in many different ways."17
Thus, Paul Schwartz has offered what he describes as a "hybrid alienability"
model of property rights in personal information 7 7 one which would "per-
mit the transfer for an initial category of use in personal data, but only if the
customer is granted an opportunity to block further transfer or use by unaf-
filiated entities."7 Similarly, Julie Cohen has suggested the possibility of a
property right in personal information that might look more like the limited
ownership rights granted under copyright law than a "traditional 'property'
71. Id. at 1300; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 1138; see also Cohen, supra note 6, at
1391 ("Thus far, whether deliberately or by oversight, we have constructed data processing
systems that do not involve the individual in decisionmaking about the uses of data collected
by the system."); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2097 (arguing that information asymmetries about
data collection and processing and the difficulty of providing understandable privacy notices
are problems for a "data trade model under which consumers have only a single chance to
negotiate future uses of their information").
72. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2078 ("[Clonsumer ignorance leads to a data market in
which one set of parties does not even know that 'negotiating' is taking place. Even if there is
a sense that some personal data are collected, many individuals do not know how or whether
this information is further processed or shared."); see also Cohen, supra note 6, at 1397 (stat-
ing that individuals "face enormous difficulty assessing how their personal information will be
used" and lack information about secondary and tertiary uses of personally identified infor-
mation).
73. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 6, at 1299 ("[I]f a right is proprietary, it is normally
fully alienable.").
74. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2093 ("[T]he idea that free alienability is an inexorable
aspect of information-property is . . . a problematic cartoon."); see also Cohen, supra note 6,
at 1382-84 (describing alternatives to "the dominant liberal market-based understanding of
property").
75. On inalienability generally, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theo-
ry of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
76. Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (2009).
77. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2094.
78. Id. at 2098. Schwartz's model also includes an "opt-in default" under which "any
further use or transfer would require the customer to opt in-that is, it would be prohibited
unless the customer affirmatively agrees to it." Id.
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right-a right against all comers and all uses."" These proposals may or
may not carry the day, but they demonstrate that it may be possible to con-
struct a right in personal information that could plausibly be characterized
as a "property" right, but that is not fully alienable.
The rights individuals would have under these proposals are a good deal
more complex, and a lot less clear, than traditional property rights in tangi-
ble goods. An individual's rights against one entity-say, the first transferee
of the individual's information-might not be the same as that individual's
rights against other entities, such as subsequent transferees. Property rights
in medical information would almost certainly have this quality, with an
individual being able to assert some rights against, say, her physician, and
different rights against, say, her insurer.
Whether the complicated set of rights contemplated here is appropriate-
ly characterized as "property" depends, of course, on how "property" is
defined. If one understands property to accord a single, identifiable owner a
set of consolidated rights that grant nearly absolute control,80 the rights
granted to individuals under these tailored control regimes might not qualify
as "property" rights at all. Many people or entities (patients, physicians,
insurers, employers) will simultaneously have ownership rights in the in-
formation contained in EHRs, with no single individual having anything like
absolute control.
Similarly, if one understands property as a set of rights in rem, good
against all the world,81 it would be hard to see the rights granted under these
complex regimes as "property" rights. In rem rights "have an impersonality
and generality that is absent from rights and privileges that attach to persons
directly."82 They send simple signals that avoid the need for decision makers
to inquire what uses an owner is making of her property or the identity of
those who owe duties to the owner.83 They operate largely within a regime
of standardization that prevents recognition of information-inefficient, spe-
cialized forms. 84 But in the complicated ownership regimes offered for
79. Cohen, supra note 6, at 1428-29.
80. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1453 (1996) (describing the "classical conception"
of property); see also LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 39 (2003) (describing
a "common" conception of property); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 277, 280-83 (1998) (describing the "intuitive image of absoluteness").
81. On property as an in rem right, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001); Henry E.
Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, I J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 69, 79 (2005).
82. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001).
83. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 978 (2004).
84. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in
the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. I (2000) (explaining
why property rights, unlike contract rights, are restricted to a limited number of standardized
forms).
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propertized information, not all-and maybe not any-rights will be good
against all the world. And the whole idea of customizing alienability in a
propertized information regime is inconsistent with the standardization that
information-based theories of property hold to be essential.
Neither of these two understandings of property-as consolidated
rights, or as rights in rem-is uncontroversial. 5 But that is my point. The
proposals to use the legal category "property" as a means to control unseen
flows of personal information raise questions of what property is and does
as a legal category. It may be that we can create a novel legal regime tailored
and customized to deal with the problems particular to information. But at
some point, the departure of that regime from existing models of property
might raise the question of whether the regime deserves the name "proper-
ty" at all. It depends, of course, on what property is.
C. Bundles of Rights in Information
Tailored, customized rights in information fit more comfortably with a
vision of property as a bundle of rights. While the bundle-of-rights metaphor
has always had its critics,86 and while the metaphor has been under particu-
larly heavy weather recently,87 there are some aspects of the bundle of rights
conceptualization that are not particularly controversial. It is widely agreed
upon that owners have multiple rights with respect to what they own-they
can use it, exclude others, sell it, give it away, and so forth." There is little
doubt also that property rights in a single asset can be divided among people
(as where one person owns surface rights and another rights to the subsur-
face) and divided over time (as where one person holds a life estate and
another a remainder).89 Ownership rights in EHRs correspond fairly easily
to this picture. Patients' ownership of their medical information might ac-
cord them multiple rights-say, to inspect their records, or to control who
85. Indeed, both have been subject to sustained criticism. On consolidation, see Singer,
supra note 80, at 1453, 1459-60. On in rem, exclusion-based, theories, see, for example,
Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063 (2009). For
a summary of the disputes within contemporary property theory about property's social func-
tion, see Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917
(2010).
86. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 711 (1996).
87. Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 787; Merrill & Smith, supra note 82, at 360;
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 10, 14), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2012815. For an overview and analysis of contemporary debates about the bundle-of-
rights metaphor, see Baron, supra note 85, at 933-53.
88. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 607
(5th ed. 2010) ("An owner of a fee simple interest in real property has the present right to
possess and use the property, the right to sell it or give it away, and the right to devise it by
will or leave it to her heirs.").
89. Id. at 595 (describing divisions of ownership over time).
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sees them. And multiple people or entities-the patient, the doctor, the la-
boratory, the insurance company-might have different, divided ownership
interests in the information in the EHR.
Even before digitization, rights in medical information were broken into
discrete pieces that seemed to render the bundle-of-rights concept particular-
ly apt. Some case law and some statutes"o held that physicians or hospitals
owned the physical charts in which patient information was recorded, while
patients owned-or had a right of access to-the information contained in
those charts.9' Other courts described the doctor's right to treatment records
as "custodial," and the patient's right of reasonable access to those records
as "a 'property' right."92 Still other courts held that doctors had a "primary
right to possess" medical records, with the patient having access rights. 93 A
recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Association explains
the "rudimentary points" of medical record ownership as follows:
Clinicians, as owners of the paper records they maintain, can give
or sell medical records to other clinicians for treatment purposes
and block access by anyone except the patient. Patients have rights
of privacy and access to their records, but neither federal nor state
law explicitly extends property rights to patients. For instance, pa-
tients do not have the right to sole possession or to the destruction
of their original records.94
90. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.96 (2011) (stating that medical records are the
property of the health care provider, but patients have a right of access); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-9-65 (West 2011) (stating that medical records are the property of the hospital, with the
patient having a right to access contingent on showing "good cause"); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 54.1-2403.3 (2011) (stating that medical records are the property of the health care provider
maintaining them, with an exception for information disclosure to the patient); see also N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-1:1 (West 2011) ("[A]ll medical information contained in the medical
records in the possession of any health care provider shall be deemed to be the property of the
patient.").
91. See, e.g., Wallace v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 82 Ohio Law Abs. 257 (1959) ("[lIt
is true that the original Hospital records are the property of the Hospital. ... [H]owever, it is
also true that the patient has a property right in the information contained in the record and
thus is entitled to a copy of it.").
92. In re Striegel, 399 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585-86 (1977); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.26265 (West 2011) (stating that patient has the right to examine or obtain his
medical record); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-115-30 (2011) (explaining the right to receive a copy
of record and transfer record to another physician).
93. Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., No. CV 960155779S, 1997 WL 430619, at *7 (Conn.
Super. July 21, 1997); see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.227 (2011) (stating that the right shall
be limited to access consistent with the patient's condition and sound therapeutic treatment as
determined by the provider); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 159.006 (West 2011) (stating that pa-
tient has access to record or summary of record unless physician deems access harmful to the
patient).
94. Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information, 301 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 1282, 1282 (2009).
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This disaggregation of rights-into property (or custody or possession)
as opposed to access; into powers of sale or donation as opposed to posses-
sion or destruction-invites us to envision property rights as isolated
"sticks" that are held by different parties. The bundle-of-rights metaphor
suits this picture in that it operates "as a device for separating the various
facets of property and for giving an intuitive grasp of their separateness and
moveability rather than their interrelatedness and porosity."95
Property rights in EHRs are likely to te even more disaggregated and
fragmented than those in paper records because digitization increases the
number of possible contributors to a patient's record. An integrated EHR
might have entries from the patient's primary care physician, multiple spe-
cialists, a laboratory, a testing facility, an insurance company, and so on.
Thus, there will be more potential claimants to the information in the
EHR-more potential "owners," in effect, than just the two (doctor and pa-
tient) involved in paper charts. The patient might also have a different right
or set of rights with respect to each potential claimant. For example (and
wholly hypothetically), a patient might have the power to control precisely
what information about, say, an initial diagnosis is distributed to a specialist
or employer, but not the same power of control with respect to an insurer.
The other contributors to the chart might similarly have non-uniform rights
with respect to one another.96
To the extent that EHRs involve multiple owners of the same infor-
mation, with the various owners having a variety of different rights and
powers with respect to each other and to the patient, envisioning "property"
in medical information in terms of a bundle of rights seems thoroughly ap-
propriate. But here again, as with proposals to limit the alienability of
property rights in personal information, 97 the complicated "bundles of
rights" that might emerge in EHRs may not, in the eyes of some, function as
"property" at all. Again, it all depends on how one defines property and how
one understands property to work.
For some, exclusion lies at property's core. Consider, in this regard, one
contemporary theorist's account of the way in which property operates:
95. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 282 (1994).
96. On the limits of various players' control rights in medical information:
[A]n individual cannot have complete control over her medical information because
access to these data is essential for the modern provision of health care. In a similar
fashion, physicians must be limited in their ability to negotiate with patients for
privacy because of the significant need for personal health care information on the
part of insurers, hospitals, and government. A physician and a patient . . . cannot
engage in fully customized negotiations because such bargaining might lead to ex-
cessive limits on the access to data of such parties as insurance programs. . ..
public health agencies, and law enforcement agencies.
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 53.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
386 [Vol. 18:367
Property as Control
Property gives the right to exclude from a "thing," enforceable
against everyone else-it is an in rem right-and a crude delegation
to the owner avoids the costs of delineating use rights. On the du-
tyholder side, the message is a simple one-to "keep out"-and this
simultaneously protects a reservoir of uses for the owner without
officials and dutyholders needing to know what those might be.98
Exclusion is relatively economical: "very rough signals or informational
variables-such as presence inside or outside the boundary line around a
parcel of land-are employed to protect an indefinite class of uses with min-
imal precision."" On this view, property relies on in rem exclusion as a
means both to protect owners' use rights and to communicate simply to non-
owners their duty to respect those rights."
The bundles of rights in medical records hardly function this way. No
single "owner" of the many interests in information in EHRs will have in
rem-type exclusion rights, nor will there be simple signals that tell either co-
owners or non-owners which persons or entities have what rights, powers, or
duties. Instead, the complicated, potentially overlapping rights to the infor-
mation in EHRs will be operationalized by a strategy at the other end of the
spectrum from exclusion: the strategy of "governance." Governance rules
evaluate interests "on something close to a use-by-use basis; rights are de-
lineated using signals . . . that pick out and protect individual uses and user
behavior."'0 1 The advantage of governance rules "is that they allow society
to control resources in non-standard ways that entail greater precision or
complexity in delineating use rights than is possible using exclusion."'02 The
relative precision of governance rules make them expensive, however, be-
cause each legal relation among diverse claimants must be individually
98. Smith, supra note 83, at 978; see also Henry E. Smith, Property and Property
Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1756 (2004) ("[Tjhe exclusion strategy bunches together a lot
of uses and does not inquire into details; it lacks the benefits of precision in terms of maximiz-
ing the value of individual uses, say from specialization by different actors in different uses of
the same asset. At the same time, the exclusion strategy avoids the costs of precision.").
In recent work, Smith has reiterated that exclusion lies at the "core" or property's "archi-
tecture." Smith, supra note 87, manuscript at 9. However, Smith goes on to assert that
exclusion is not property's core value "because it is not a value at all" but rather a means to
the end of serving owners' interest in the use of things. Id.
99. Smith, supra note 83, at 978-79.
100. Smith, supra note 81, at 78; Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 98, at
1754.
101. Id. at 979; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 791 ("[G]overnance rules
typically specify particular uses in some detail, including the identity of the rightholder and
the dutyholder. Indeed, often the dutyholder will need to know the identity of the rightholder
in order to avoid violating the duty.").
102. Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 797.
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spelled out.o 3 Thus, as the number of people who interact with an asset in-
creases, the costs of governance also increase.'O
Of course, even those who favor the exclusion strategy envision a role
for governance where "high stakes" are involved,'0o and where a more pre-
cise, user-by-user delineation of entitlements is required. 0 6 Yet if property's
distinct ability to solve social ordering problems derives from its use of rela-
tively crude, simple, inexpensive signals, then the intricately bundled,
customized rights to the information in EHRs do not seem to take much ad-
vantage of property's unique ability to decide questions "up front and across
the board."' In this view, the bundled rights in EHRs effectively treat prop-
erty "as a branch of contract or tort, with no special character as a right to a
thing that is good against the world."'08
In addition to the lack of fit between the exclusion-centered conception
of property and the user-by-user delineation of rights to information in
EHRs, the highly-customized rights in EHRs are inconsistent with the influ-
ential view that rights in property traditionally come-and should come-in
a limited variety of standardized forms.'" This principle, known as numerus
clausus ("the number is closed"),"10 is, like exclusion, defended on the
grounds of information costs."' Unusual property rights increase the costs
borne by third parties to understand the scope or nature of those rights, but
"those creating . . . idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected
to take these increases in measurement costs fully into account, making
them a true externality. Standardization of property rights reduces these
measurement costs.""12
It is theoretically possible that the rights to information bundled in
EHRs will take the standardized forms of traditional estates in land. But it
seems more likely that the bundles will not be standardized in this way. In-
deed, if the rights in EHRs are not customized in fairly elaborate ways,
EHRs will be dysfunctional; if each participant's powers and duties are not
carefully and deliberately defined, the individual, social, and network bene-
103. Smith, supra note 83, at 981.
104. At some point, "the information costs of specifying which individuals have the
right to do what will simply become too great." Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 798.
105. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 2083, 2086 (2009); see also Smith, supra note 83, at 1024-25 (arguing that where to
draw the line between exclusion and governance is an "empirical question").
106. Smith, supra note 83, at 975-76; Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note
98, at 1797.
107. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963 (2009).
108. Id.; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 787 ("The duty to respect the prop-
erty of others . . . has an impersonality and generality that is qualitatively different from duties
that derive from specific promises or relationships.").
109. Merrill & Smith, supra note 84, at 8.




fits of EHRs will not be achieved." 3 Thus, the interests in EHRs must be
freely customizable, and not standardized. This deprives them of the infor-
mation cost benefits that some scholars believe make the legal category
"property" exceptional.14
Just as not all scholars concur that alienability is a defining attribute of
property, not all scholars concur that information costs should drive our
understanding of what property is and does. There is substantial resistance
to the notion that exclusion lies at property's core." 5 For those who be-
lieve property should promote human flourishing," 6  freedom," 7  or
democracy" 8-just to state a few of the many values property law might
serve" 9-the question to be asked about property rights in EHRs is not
whether they are framed in terms of exclusion but rather whether they lead
to outcomes that can be justified in substantive terms.120 For these scholars,
it is immaterial whether the exclusion or governance strategy governs
property rights in EHRs. What matters is the values ultimately served by
whatever package of rights is put together.121
Similarly, not all scholars agree that standardization is an essential, or
even valuable, attribute of property rights. The standard forms of the old
estates system, such scholars argue, are only a small portion of today's
property system, which has been supplemented by statutes and regulations
reaching into wide swathes of social life-from zoning to housing to mar-
riage. 2 2 Thus, just as we might conceivably customize the alienability of
113. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
114. Merrill & Smith, supra note 82, at 387 (describing the "intolerable" information
costs imposed by freely customized rights.); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 84, at 27
(describing the high information costs imposed by "fancies," i.e., idiosyncratically created
property rights).
115. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 85, at 1066 ("[Tlhe core [of property] is more
complex than exclusion alone."); Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property 8 (June
7, 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416580
("[E]xclusion ... can exhaust the meaning of property and thus be properly described at its
core only if we set aside, somewhat arbitrarily, large parts of what constitutes property law.").
116. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 745 (2009).
117. See Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom -Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed
Tradition for Old Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1237, 1242 (2005).
I 18. See generally Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. Rev. 1009 (2009).
119. On the diversity of values property protects, see Nestor M. Davidson, Standardiza-
tion and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008).
120. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 118, at 1059 ("In defining rights and obligations with
respect to property, we are obligated to consider the full range of human values we care about
rather than merely thinking quantitatively about how to maximize preferences."); see also
Baron, supra note 85, at 932 (describing how, for progressive property theorists, "what is
most interesting and important about property is the outcomes it produces").
121. Baron, supra note 85, at 952-53 (describing property theories that "require constant
questioning of whether property rules actually serve the values for which they were adopted").
122. Singer, supra note 118, at 1052 ("We use a combination of common law, statutes,
and social custom to define the boundaries of allowable packages of property rights . . . .").
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property rights in EHRs, we might customize to a high degree of precision
and complexity the nature and scope of the various participants' rights.
Again, the point here is not that exclusion-centered rights to the infor-
mation in EHRs would be better (or worse) than bundled governance rights,
or that standardizing the bundles would be better (or worse) than tailoring
them. The point is that whether any particular configuration of rights to in-
formation is appropriately categorized in terms of "property" exposes fault
lines in our understanding of what property is and does. Property is a con-
tested concept,123 and debates over whether property is a useful legal frame
in which to organize various participants' interests in the information in
EHRs only exposes the lack of agreement about what property is. It is hard
to see how the problem of information control can be "fixed" by resort to a
legal regime whose substance and scope are pervasively disputed.
II. INFORMATION AND PROPERTY RHETORIC
Section A of this Part begins by reconsidering the harm caused by loss
of control of personal information, arguing that at least one component of
harm involves an individual's loss of power to determine which facts relat-
ing to his or her self are disclosed and how those facts are presented.
Because there is no single, agreed-upon definition of the "self," 24 I consider
several possible visions, based on dignity, autonomy, self-determination, and
community. Under any of these conceptualizations, definition by others is
properly understood as an assault on the self. In the face of such an assault,
attempts to (re)gain control of information about oneself through property
make good sense. They may be understood as yet another way that property
may be used for personhood, as Margaret Radin famously suggested long
ago.125
Section B focuses on one danger of propertization. As noted earlier, it
may be feasible to create tailored, highly customized bundles of rights that
address some of the unique aspects of information generally and medical
information specifically. Whether or not these bundles solve the practical
problem of controlling information, the very notion of property in personal
information-in the "self"-creates rhetorical issues. If how we speak about
the world matters-and some believe that it matters very much' 26-then we
123. Baron, supra note 85, at 918-21.
124. For particularly influential views, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF
SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (Charles W.
Morris, ed., 1934); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY (1989).
125. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
126. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability", 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849,
1870 (1987) ("Rhetoric is not just shaped by, but shapes, reality."); Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604-10 (discussing the importance of our
choice of rhetoric and metaphor).
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ought to consider whether talking about our "selves" as commodities is or is
not a good thing. We ought to consider, also, whether in our current non-
ideal world, where information is already bought and sold like ordinary
property in the hands of, inter alia, database aggregators, we can avoid a
property frame.
Section C takes up the casebook chestnut Moore v. Regents of Califor-
nia. Moore addressed a different commodification question-the issue of a
person's property rights to his own body, not just information about his
body.'27 But the court confronted several questions relevant to the issue of
property rights in information. The opinions suggest, first, that even those
who agree that property is appropriately conceived as a bundle of rights dis-
agree on how many rights must be in the bundle for an asset to constitute
"property." The opinions suggest, second, that even where there is a consen-
sus on the values at stake with respect to the commodification of the self, we
may not reach agreement on whether granting individuals property rights in
their physical selves will further or defeat those values. Finally, the opin-
ions-and Moore's underlying claim-suggest that sometimes it is others'
use of an item for commercial or other value that makes a property "frame"
seem appropriate for that item. Since the connection between value and
property is tenuous, it is worth exploring how easily property can appear
salient, especially since, as I will argue, the property frame may have signif-
icant costs.
A. "Self" Control
To state the obvious, a ton of information is available on the Internet.
We are only too happy to be able to learn with but a few mouse clicks the
name of Gambia's capital city (if you are interested, Banjul) or the phone
numbers of our favorite restaurants or the costs and schedules of airplane
flights between our home towns and wherever we intend to go for vacation.
But some information is different. I would neither expect nor want in-
formation about my particular medical history or current medical problems
to be available to everyone on the Internet. Why not? For one thing, medical
information is subject to duties of confidentiality, and its accessibility might
suggest a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation by my physician, a breach
that violates the terms of the special relationship under which I have en-
trusted my interests to her.12 8 But violation of trust or other duties does not
fully capture my concerns. I would be just as upset-indeed, probably more
upset-about the disclosure of my medical information if it resulted from an
unforeseen and unforeseeable hacking of my doctor's records by evil-doers
using innovative technology against which my doctor could not reasonably
127. Moore did claim a right to be informed about his doctors' non-therapeutic interest
in his cells. For the specifics of Moore's claims, see infra text accompanying notes 182-183.
128. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 135, 157 (2007).
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defend. In summary, with respect to personal information, I might have two
related concerns: the first relates to what is public, and the second relates to
how it became public.
The information in my medical record is, in a fairly straightforward
sense, information about my "self." Other information related to my self is,
of course, already available on the Internet. On the website of the law school
for which I work, anyone can find a "profile" of me, including my resume, a
brief narrative biography, and other "professional" facts such as a list of the
conferences at which I have recently spoken.129 In many ways, this infor-
mation is different from the information in my doctor's EHR. One obvious
difference is that I chose to disclose these particular facts about myself, as
contrasted with the involuntary disclosure produced by physician careless-
ness or by hacking.
A second difference might appear to be that the information about my
professional life is less sensitive or personal. But this distinction is hard to
sustain. Because I have been a law professor for a very long time and be-
cause my work matters deeply to me, I care a great deal about both what
information about my professional life is presented and how it is presented.
Even if my law school had not already posted my CV to the web, I might
not care much if a hacker invaded my computer files, found the r6sum6 I
created, and put it up on the Internet for all the world to see. And yet I might
feel very differently if that same hacker posted, say, the rejections I have
received from law reviews or an early draft of an article with a controversial,
"half-baked" thesis. And surely I would be devastated if the hacker had
found and posted, say, negative faculty recommendations related to my ten-
ure and promotion, or unfounded student allegations of harassment. I would
have just as strong an interest in controlling whether this information (or
misinformation) about my professional "self' becomes available, and in
what form, as I do in the information about my medical "self."
What we see here again is that medical information-which is "secret"
and "sensitive"-is at least in some circumstances but an instantiation of the
larger category of "personal information." Medical information clearly con-
cerns the "self," but so does other information. In all instances, what we
desire is control and what we fear is the loss of the power to define our
selves.13 0 This loss may occur through involuntary, unconsented to disclo-
sure, e.g., where insufficient care is taken to safeguard information or where,
as in hacking, the information is stolen notwithstanding responsible efforts
129. Jane B. Baron Faculty Bio, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.temple.edu/Pages/Faculty/NFaculty-BaronMain.aspx (last visited Feb. 20,
2012).
130. Whether those who grew up in a time of pervasive social networking on sites such
as Facebook will have the same concerns about self-control is a topic beyond the scope of this
Article. For a brief consideration of the issues, see Mark A. Rothstein, Health Privacy and the




to safeguard it. Or the loss may occur in more subtle ways, where we do not
choose which non-confidential facts about ourselves are revealed or the way
in which those facts are presented.
Should the law concern itself with these sorts of losses of "self' con-
trol? Some of these losses involve very tangible consequences. Identity theft
is an obvious example. In such cases, the "self' who is buying or selling
property, applying for or defaulting on loans, and the like, is literally not
who she seems to be, and injures the "self' she has stolen by saddling her
with unwanted debt, ruined credit, and other financial injuries.131 Along the
same lines, when one cannot control the "self' presented to an employer or
to the world at large, one might lose employment opportunities or suffer
injury to one's reputation.132
But tangible or actual injury may not exhaust the field of injury to self.
We do not worry only about our monetizable assets, but also about control-
ling the construction of our identity. To the extent that out-of-control
information threatens our ability, alone or with others, to create our own
selves, it poses a threat we may ask the law to address. Should we have the
legal power to control our "selves" in cyberspace? There are some powerful
arguments in the affirmative.
In a variety of contexts, it has been argued that what it means to be a
person is to inventl33 or author' 34 one's own self, to create one's own narra-
tives that organize disparate life events and experiences into coherent
stories. 35 But the "digital person," created by unseen others out of one's
credit card uses, mouse clicks, ATM withdrawals, and the like,'36 deprives
individuals of the ability to create their own selves or author their own sto-
ries. The interest in self-invention or self-authorship might sound in
131. On the injuries of identity theft, see SOLOVE, supra note 5, at 109-19.
132. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 18, at 490. On the financial and reputation injuries that
can be caused by insecure information, see generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Priva-
cy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 516-17 (2006).
133. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as
Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 79, 117 (2009) ("[P]rotecting individual liberty entails
securing to the greatest possible extent the free construction of the self and one's identity ....
[L]iberty [is] self-invention.").
134. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1655 ("individuals who exercise self-determination
... should be defined as people who, as part authors of their lives, substantially shape their
existence through the choices they make"); Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The
Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 554 (2011) (describing the
self in terms of autonomy, "one core aspect" of which "is self-determination. . . . A person is
self-determined to the extent that she is the author of her own ideals, goals and preferences.").
135. See Williams, supra note 134, at 568-70; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 217 (3d ed. 2007) (describing elements of a narrative
sense of self); TAYLOR, supra note 124, at 47 (arguing that we make sense of our lives as
stories).
136. See SOLOVE, supra note 5, at 1.
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liberty,' autonomy,'38 or dignity.'13 Regardless, inability to create one's
own self may be experienced as a serious loss.140
There is a different way to understand the self and the harm to self from
uncontrolled flows of personal information. In this view, the development of
individuality requires experimentation and deliberation, the opportunity to
make-and possibly to regret-individual and social choices, and to derive
from this process one's own beliefs, stances, and conceptions of the good.' 4'
But, some scholars argue, who would take intellectual, social, or creative
risks if risk-taking were subject to constant scrutiny? 42 How could one try
out a particular stance-toward politics, sexuality, or anything else-if the
person one "inhabited" at one particular moment could be captured by
others, who in effect might freeze it as one's identity for all time? If self-
determination takes time 43 and practice,144 then the constant monitoring of
personal information will change the selves we develop.145
Alternatively, consider the possibility that the self is created socially, by
reference to "rules of deference and demeanor," or "rules of civility," that
command the forms of respect individuals are entitled to receive from oth-
ers.146 Under "the social norms that govern the flow of information in
137. Mitnick, supra note 133, at 117.
138. Williams, supra note 134, at 554.
139. See Kang, supra note 5, at 1260 (describing "dignity" as one of "the most funda-
mental reasons for respecting information privacy.").
140. In the medical context, self-creation can be problematic. A patient who moves to a
new state might choose not to tell his new physician of past mental health, substance abuse, or
sexual problems, and would thus author a story about himself that is inaccurate and inauthen-
tic. Paper records do nothing to prevent this phenomenon. The interoperability of EHRs make
this particular form of self-invention impossible. On the other hand, the information in the
EHR will remain in the record permanently, and, as developed infra text accompanying notes
219-235, the interoperability of the electronic record may enhance the patient's vulnerability
to disclosure and consequent desire for control of access to the EHR.
141. Cohen, supra note 6, at 1426.
142. See Solove, supra note 132, at 493 ("Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and
inhibition."). Again, it is not clear whether this observation applies to a generation accustomed
to constant self-exposure in social media.
143. Cohen, supra note 6, at 1424 ("[Ajutonomous individuals do not spring full-blown
from the womb.").
144. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2087 ("[D]eliberative democracy requires lim-
its to access to personal information because Americans will hesitate to engage in democratic
self-rule should widespread and secret surveillance become the norm."); Schwartz, supra note
52, at 1653 (arguing for limited access to personal data "to allow individuals, alone and in
association with others, to deliberate about how to live their lives").
145. Cohen, supra note 6, at 1425-26 ("The point is not that people will not learn under
conditions of no-privacy, but that they will learn differently .... Pervasive monitoring of
every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the
mainstream."). Both Cohen and Schwartz worry about pressure towards conformity not only
in terms of the loss to individuals, but the losses to the vitality of democratic deliberation,
which requires well-developed, self-governing citizens. See id. at 1426-27; Schwartz, supra
note 52, at 1658-66; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 2087.
146. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 963-67 (1989).
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modem society," individuals may appropriately expect, as a matter of re-
spect, to control informational "preserves" or "territories."' 47 These
preserves or territories "provide a normative framework for the development
of personality,"l 48 and are thus "constitutive of human dignity." 49 Violation
of civility rules, the failure to respect information preserves, thus injures the
ability to develop one's own self.5 o
Obviously, none of these visions of the self is uncontroversial or com-
plete. They are useful, however, in evaluating why disclosures of personal
information might be troubling even in the absence of conventionally-
recognized economic or reputational injury. And they provide a way to
understand why individuals might care deeply about who controls both the
amount and the form of personal information available about them. They
give us, in other words, another reason to see why the category of property
holds the potential for providing the sort of control individuals seek over
their very "selves."
This vision of property as "self' control ties in with yet another influen-
tial view of property: the view that property can connect to "personhood."''
In Margaret Jane Radin's influential Property and Personhood article, she
asserted that "to achieve proper self-development-to be a person-an indi-
vidual needs some control over resources in the external environment. The
necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights."'52 The
personhood view contemplates that "a person can be bound up with an ex-
ternal 'thing' in some constitutive sense."' 53 Where that is appropriately the
case,154 property that is personal deserves a higher degree of protection than
property that is merely fungible.'55
Assuming information can be a thing,156 a "resource in the external en-
vironment," it is clearly capable of being constitutive of the self in any of the
ways described above. To the persons to whom information pertains, the
information is personal in Radin's sense of the term, while to other per-
sons-the data aggregators or others who use the information as a
147. Id. at 984.
148. Id. at 985.
149. Id. at 1008.
150. Id. at 1009 (suggesting such violations also signal a weakening of community ties).
151. Radin, supra note 125.
152. Id. at 957.
153. Id. at 960.
154. Radin concedes that "there is bad as well as good in being bound up with external
objects" and that people can be bound up with objects "in the wrong way or to too great an
extent." Id. at 961.
155. Id. at 986 ("[T]he personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements:
The more closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement."); Id. at 960 (ex-
plaining that fungible property, in this view, is property valued "for purely instrumental
reasons.").
156. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 98, at 1754 (including "intangi-
bles" along with tangible "things").
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commercial asset-the information is quintessentially fungible. Thus, to the
subjects of information flows, data has a value different from the value it has
to users of the information, and this value arguably warrants its protection
"against cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other peo-
ple."'17 Because personal information connects to personhood, we might
give individuals property rights to control the flows of information about
them.
Of course, Radin's theory of property and personhood is no less contro-
versial than theories of property as involving consolidated, in rem, or
bundles of rights."' To those who would base property rights on first pos-
session,15 9 it is not obvious why data aggregators do not already own the
information in question.160 To those who would base property rights on la-
bor, it is again unclear that the subject of the information will have a better
claim to own it than those who worked to collect it.'"' Finally, for those who
define property in terms of efficiency-based market trades, it is not obvious
why property rights in personal information should be held by the subjects
of that information as opposed to those who value the information enough to
have paid to acquire it.' 62
The point here is not that these more traditional theories of property are
better than a personhood theory. Rather, the point is that, from these
perspectives, "personhood" is not relevant to whether individuals have a prop-
erty interest or not. In the absence of a single, accepted "meta"-definition of
157. Radin, supra note 125, at 1015.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 80-108.
I 59. On first possession, see Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design
of the Law, 38 LL. & EcoN. 393 (1995); Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of
Property: From Conquest & Possession to Democracy and Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J.
763 (2011).
160. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1382 ("[P]ersonhood theory ... seems an odd way of
talking about my control over data that others already possess.").
In the absence of originality, the facts in databases are not eligible for copyright protec-
tion. Feist, 499 U.S. 340. Thus, data aggregators do not technically "own" the information that
they compile. On the rights of data aggregators, see Daniel Gervais, The Protection of Data-
bases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights
and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773,
814 (2003); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 66, at 137. However, "the fact that ... data-
bases-as-compilations are not regarded by US law as property does not stop those who
compile them from trading them . . . . The market effectively creates a property right where
there is an impetus to deal commercially with the item in question, regardless of the stance a
particular legislature might take on the creation of a property right." Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed
Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information Systems, 35 Lov. U. CI.
L.J. 235, 251 (2003).
161. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1381. The labor theory is conventionally traced back to
Locke. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. 1988) (1690).
162. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1381; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAw 32-34 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that the role of property rights is to incentivize
individuals to invest in their property and its most efficient use, with the assurance that they
will recoup the costs incurred through wealth-maximizing transactions with others).
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property, nothing guarantees that the personhood perspective will prevail.
But if one believes that property can connect to personhood, and if one sees
information about one's self as "personal" property in Radin's sense of that
term, then one can plausibly argue that one's property interest in one's per-
sonal information has a special claim to legal protection-a claim that at the
very least is superior to the claims of others, in whose hands the information
is merely fungible. Were this argument to prevail, individuals' property
rights would give them the ability to control both what information about
them is made public and in what form. In this way, property for personhood
might give rise to a right of "self' control.
B. "Self" Commodification
Let us assume that, based on concern for personhood (or some other
concern), we grant individuals very simple property rights to information
about themselves. Individuals would be able to keep information out of cir-
culation altogether; information would be unavailable without its owner's
consent. Individuals could also determine how information is presented by
imposing conditions on disclosure. The "digital" self would be the self an
individual chose to present, not a self constructed by others in secret. After
all, if someone wants access to my bracelet or my copy of a rare first edition
of Great Expectations, I must first agree to her use; why should access to
my weight or history of law review rejections be any different? If someone
wants what is mine, she must persuade me to sell it or give it away. The
choice is mine to make. This is how property might give me "self' control:
if I want you to have information about me, I'll sell or give it to you, and if I
don't, I won't.
As we have seen, the "market" for information has potential problems,
such as information asymmetries between sellers and buyers about the use
to be made of information after its initial sale.163 These problems might lead
to adjustments in the freedom to make trades, i.e., to regulation of infor-
mation markets. But, in the property paradigm, "self' control requires that
the individual have some power over personal information, including the
power to sell it, even if under limited conditions. Thus, we would have
(some kind of) a market in personal information.
While markets for information make a good deal of sense in terms of
"self' control, the notion of selling one's "self" is not entirely appealing.
Morally, "self" selling seems troubling because it treats deeply personal,
self-defining "goods" in personal information identically to every other
"good," and reduces people to the sum of their sales.'" Rhetorically, "self'
163. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
164. Radin, supra note 126, at 1861 (describing a regime of "universal market rhetoric"
in which "everything that is desired or valued is conceived of and spoken of as a 'good,'" and
in which "the person is conceived of and spoken of as the possessor and trader of these goods,
and hence all human interactions are sales."). On the moral dimension of this observation, see
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selling sounds bad-do we want to talk about the "self' in the same way we
do unremarkable objects such as mousetraps or bath towels? Is it appropri-
ate to commodify the self, i.e., to treat the self as a separate "thing" that can
be traded?' 1 5
These concerns might seem overblown. The "property" in question is
information-data-about persons. Surely persons are not constituted as
selves solely in terms of data; they are not aggregates of facts such as their
bicod pressure, persistent back pain, or history of publication success or
failure. To trade in information about the self is surely different from trading
one's very self.
This argument is in some sense true-none of us is entirely the sum of
all the facts that might be revealed about us. But it is also in some sense un-
true. If there is anything to the idea of the digital person, we must take
seriously that in cyberspace, we are created as selves precisely in terms of
the aggregate of the uncountable facts of our phone calls, credit card trans-
actions, age, voting record, mouse clicks, and the like. The self we seek to
control via property is in fact constituted of data. In this sense it is, lamenta-
bly, the case that in selling personal information we sell our selves. Putting
this point another way, it is hard to argue that data aggregators rob us of the
ability to create our own selves and at the same time to argue that data about
us is disconnected from our selves.
If we are to some extent our personal information, and if we are to con-
trol our selves by our decisions about trading that information, then our
property rights in information will involve at least some commodification of
our selves. For some theorists, this phenomenon is deeply problematic. As
Radin puts it, "in our understanding of personhood we are committed to an
ideal of individual uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that each
person's attributes are fungible, that they have a monetary equivalent, and
that they can be traded off against those of other people."' 6 6 To those who
take this view, even talking about personal attributes in market terms is dan-
gerous. In Radin's now-famous words:
Market rhetoric, if adopted by everyone, and in many contexts,
would indeed transform the texture of the human world. This rheto-
ric leads us to view politics as just rent seeking, reproductive
capacity as just a scarce good for which there is high demand, and
the repugnance to slavery as just a cost. To accept these views is to
Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic
Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 431 (1996).
165. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIEs 58 (1996); Radin, supra note
125, at 966 ("We have an intuition that property necessarily refers to something in the outside
world, separate from oneself."); see also Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human
Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359, 364 (2000) ("[P]roperty envisions a person who 'owns' and is
thus distinct from his or her body . . . .").
166. Radin, supra note 126, at 1885.
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accept the conception of human flourishing they imply, one that is
inferior to the conception that we can accept as properly ours.16 1
If personal information connects in important ways to our selves, then trad-
ing it has the potential to undermine our identity,'68 to alienate us (in both
the property and psychological sense) from our selves.16 9
Again, though, we confront a fault line in property theory. As Landes
and Posner's proposal for a market in babies illustrates, not everyone be-
lieves that commodification of even the most controversial "goods" is a bad
thing.17 0 More specifically, there is considerable disagreement over whether
the commodification of identity is necessarily degrading.'7 ' In addition,
some theorists resist the dichotomization of market and non-market realms,
arguing that many interpersonal transactions have market elements and vice
versa. 7 2 Perhaps commodification is just not a worrisome phenomenon.'73
Moreover, even if we accept the view that commodification is at least
potentially troubling as a moral or rhetorical matter, it is not entirely clear
whether we should worry about the commodification of personal infor-
mation. Concern about commodification is concern that the "wrong" things
will be commodified; it does not worry us to trade mousetraps and bath tow-
els. But it should worry us, commodification theorists argue, when we
commodify the "many kinds of particulars-one's politics, work, religion,
family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral
commitments, character, and personal attributes" that are "integral to the
167. Id. at 1884.
168. Id. at 1905 ("[Ulniversal commodification undermines personal identity by con-
ceiving of personal attributes ... as monetizable and alienable from the self.").
169. Id. at 1907 (describing "two kinds of alienation" created when the personal is treat-
ed as fungible).
170. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7
J. LEG. STUD. 323 (1978).
171. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Kwanzaa and the Commodification of Black Culture, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 178 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
172. Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That
is Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 171, at 362, 368-69; see
also Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither Commodification?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICA-
TION, supra note 171, at 402.
173. Radin's arguments about commodification have been critiqued on a variety of
grounds. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993) (arguing against Radin's notion that,
without state-imposed restraints, commodification inevitably follows from market alienabil-
ity); see also Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 657 (1995)
(arguing that there is no uncontroversial way to define market-inalienable property); Peter
Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996) (arguing that personhood has been commodified in a variety of
ways over time); Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of
Personal Property As the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994) (arguing that
market alienation creates community by enabling interactions among people, which fosters
dependence on people instead of objects).
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self." 74 To return to the observation that we are more than the sum of data
available about us, it is not entirely clear that all or even much of the infor-
mation about us in cyberspace is "integral" to the self in this sense. Radin
admits that the line can be hard to draw: "there is no algorithm or abstract
formula to tell us which items are (justifiably) personal. A moral judgment
is required in each case.""' Yet it is not clear that all would share moral
judgments about which items of personal information it is improper to
trade.'76
Finally, even if we assume that commodification is potentially problem-
atic, and that personal information is the kind of integral-to-self good that
we should be particularly worried about trading, commodification may
nonetheless be our fate. As Radin concedes, we live in a "nonideal"
world."' We do not create a legal order on a clean slate, but must confront
existing realities that change the valence of rights we might otherwise as-
sert. In the case of information, the existing reality is that an unimaginable
amount of information has already been collected about each of us, and that
information is aggressively traded-is controlled-by data aggregators who
are invisible to us. This reality creates a double bind analogous to the one
described by Radin in respect of the sale of sexual services:7 8 if we provide
individuals property rights to personal information, we create the moral and
rhetorical problems described above, but if we fail to provide individuals
property rights to personal information, we enhance the power of others, in
whose hands the information is solely a commodity. In the real world, in-
formation is already effectively commodified property, and the only
question is whose."' But just as "property" alone cannot tell us what to treat
as personal and what as fungible, "property" alone cannot decide who
174. Radin, supra note 126, at 1905-06.
175. Id. at 1908.
176. Putting this point another way, commodification theory does not tell us how to tell
what are attributes of the self, or what we can and cannot appropriately separate from the self.
177. Radin, supra note 126, at 1915.
178. Id. at 1916-17 ("If we now permit commodification, we may exacerbate the op-
pression of women-the suppliers. If we now disallow commodification-without what I
have called the welfare-rights corollary, or large-scale redistribution of social wealth and
power -we force women to remain in circumstances that they themselves believe are worse
than becoming sexual commodity-suppliers.").
179. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996) ("[Personal information,] like all
information, is property. The question the law must answer is: Who owns the property rights
to such information-the individual involved, the person who obtains the information, or
some combination?"). As noted supra note 160, the legal status of data aggregators' rights to
ownership of the information in their databases is not entirely clear.
Radin argues that in situations such as these, where "we cannot respect personhood ei-
ther by permitting sales or banning sales, justice requires that we consider changing the
circumstances that create the dilemma." Radin, supra note 126, at 1917. Nonetheless, she
recognizes, "we still must chose a regime for the meantime." Id. Whatever that regime, infor-
mation will be commodified.
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should own commodified information. In both instances, a moral judgment
is required.
C. "Self" Ownership
Much of the commodification debate has played out in connection with
the issue of self-ownership in a literal sense: do we "own" our own physical
bodies or parts thereof?180 Many of those who entered law school after 1990
have encountered this issue in connection with Moore v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California,'5 ' now a staple of almost every basic Property
casebook. 182 In Moore, the plaintiff alleged that the use of his cells by others
without his permission for potentially lucrative medical research constituted
"conversion" of his property. In a wide-ranging opinion that evaluated both
existing common law and its possible extension, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held that Moore had failed to state a cause of action for conversion,
but that his complaint did state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
or lack of informed consent.' 83 The opinion has much to teach about proper-
ty's limits in deciding questions about control of the "self."
Moore's facts are simple.'" Moore had hairy-cell leukemia, for which he
was referred to Dr. David Golde, a physician at the University of California,
Los Angeles. Golde performed a variety of tests on Moore's blood, bone
marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances to confirm the diagnosis, and,
for therapeutic reasons, ultimately removed Moore's spleen. Moore's com-
plaint alleged that almost from the start of the treatment, Golde and the
other defendants 85 believed that Moore's cells were of great scientific and
commercial value, but did not disclose to Moore their plan to develop a
commercially-valuable cell line from the tissue removed from Moore's
body. To make matters worse, over the five years following the surgery,
Golde directed Moore to return on several occasions, where additional
180. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: law, Capacity, and Organ Com-
modification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2004); Peter Halewood, On Commodification and
Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131 (2008); Rao, supra note 165.
181. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). While the Moore
case brought the issue of ownership of human tissue to the forefront of academic attention, it
was neither the first nor the last instance in which human tissue was removed or used for re-
search and commercial purposes without a patient's knowledge or consent. For the story of
Henrietta Lacks, whose cells were removed, used, and commercialized without consent long
before Moore's, see SKLOOT, supra note 16. For a more recent case involving allegations of
unauthorized use of human tissue, see Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Insti-
tute, Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
182. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 69 (7th ed. 2010); THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 255 (2007); SINGER, supra note 88.
183. 793 P.2d at 497.
184. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and so the case was decided entirely on
the pleadings. Id. at 480.
185. The other four defendants were the Regents of the University of California, who
owned and operated the hospital; Shirley G. Quan, a researcher employed by Regents; Genet-
ics Institute, Inc.; and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and related entities. Id. at 480-81.
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samples of blood and tissue were removed-possibly without any medical
reason and definitely without disclosure to Moore that the removed cells
would be used for research purposes. Ultimately, the efforts of Golde and
the other defendants resulted in a new, patented cell line, allegedly worth
over three billion dollars.
The court's opinion totals nearly fifty pages in length.'16 Professors
teaching first year law students could not have ordered up a better introduc-
tion to the building blocks of legal argumentation, as the majority opinion
rejects the conversion claim on grounds of common law and statutory doc-
trine, of policy, and of institutional competence. Much could be and has
been written about the case,'"8 7 but I focus here on three of its aspects that
relate directly to the question of property in personal information: the
opinions' examination of "self"-ownership, of the perils of "self'-
commodification, and of the possibility that Moore's property claims
might rest on or derive from the value that others had obtained from his
cells and tissue.
Moore's claims to self-ownership arose in a legal landscape cluttered by
public health statutes governing such matters as organ donation, blood pro-
curement, and, most importantly for Moore, tissue disposal.' The statute
on tissue disposal,'"8 which required that "following conclusion of scientific
use" human tissues be disposed of "by interment, incineration," or other
186. This total includes one concurring opinion, one opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and one dissent.
187. See, e.g., Benjamin Appelbaum, Moore v. Regents of the University of California:
Now that the California Supreme Court Has Spoken, What Has It Really Said?, 9 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. Hum. RTs. 495 (1992) (analyzing Moore in terms of the case's impact on the scientific
community); Karen G. Biagi, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Patients,
Property Rights, and Public Policy, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433 (1991) (arguing that the public
policy arguments on which the court based its decision are outweighed by the patient's right
to assert a commercial interest in his tissues); Anne T. Corrigana, A Paper Tiger: Inwsuits
Against Doctors for Non-Disclosure of Economic Interests in Patients' Cells, Tissues and
Organs, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 565 (1992) (evaluating whether the causes of action Moore
recognized effectively protect patients' interests); K. Peter Ritter, Moore v. Regents of the
University of California: The Splenetic Debate Over Ownership of Human Tissue, 21 Sw. U.
L. REV. 1465 (1992) (arguing that human body parts and tissues can be treated as a form of
tangible personal property). These articles are merely illustrative; hundreds of law review
articles cite and discuss Moore.
188. "[T]he laws governing such things as human tissues, transplantable organs, blood,
fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies deal with human biological materials
as objects sui generis . . . . It is these specialized statutes, not the law of conversion, to which
courts ordinarily should and do look for guidance on the disposition of human biological ma-
terials." 793 P.2d at 489.
189. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human
tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use
shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state
department to protect the public health and safety. As used in this section, 'infectious waste'
means any material or article which has been, or may have been, exposed to contagious or
infectious disease." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (2011).
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approved methods, proved particularly problematic for Moore. As the ma-
jority interpreted the statute:
One cannot escape the conclusion that the statute's practical effect
is to limit, drastically, a patient's control over excised cells. By re-
stricting how excised cells may be used and requiring their eventual
destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily
attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left
amounts to "property" or "ownership" for purposes of conver-
sion.19 0
In the majority's view, then, the legislature had spoken, and while "the Leg-
islature did not specifically intend this statute to resolve the question of
whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the nonconsensual use of
excised cells,""9 ' it had so depleted the rights in the patient's bundle that
what remained could not plausibly be called "property."
In dissent, Justice Mosk took direct issue with the majority's conclu-
sion. After specifically referring to the view of property as a bundle of
rights, Mosk noted that "the same bundle of rights does not attach to all
forms of property."' 92 He then listed a variety of limitations routinely im-
posed on property interests, including time, place, and manner-based limits
on use, restrictions on sale, restrictions on gifts, and wholesale restraints on
alienability.193 These limitations, he argued, did not render the remaining
interest too weak or empty to be called property: "The limitation or prohibi-
tion diminishes the bundle of rights that would otherwise attach to the
property," Mosk wrote, "yet what remains is still deemed in law to be a pro-
tectable property interest." 94
Notice that the majority and the dissent did not disagree on the relevant
theory or definition of property; this was not a dispute as to whether proper-
ty rights are best characterized as standardized rights in rem or as bundles of
rights.'9 5 Both the majority and the dissent were willing to analyze Moore's
conversion claim through a bundle of rights frame. However, their agree-
ment on what property theory to apply was not sufficient to bring them into
accord; they could not reach consensus on how many rights must be in the
bundle for a "property" claim to survive. This disagreement bodes ill for
those who look to the field of property to provide definite answers to new
questions involving control of personal information.
The same pattern of agreement on first principles, but disagreement on
their application, can be seen in the Moore opinions' treatment of the problem
190. 793 P.2d at 491-92.
191. Id. at 491.
192. Id. at 509.
193. Id. at 510.
194. Id.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84, 86-108.
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of commodification. Justice Arabian, concurring, wrote to "speak of the
moral issue," 9 6 which he defined as follows:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's
own body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human ves-
sel-the single most venerated and protected subject in any human
society-as equal with the basest commodity. He urges us to com-
mingle the sacred with the profane. He asks much.' 9
Because Justice Arabian could not be sure whether treating human tissue as
"a fungible article of commerce" would "uplift or degrade" the "unique hu-
man persona,"' 98 he agreed with the majority that the decision was best left
in legislative hands. 99
Justices Mosk and Broussard both dissented on this exact point. Justice
Mosk agreed that "our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative
to respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the
unique human persona."2 00 But that respect, Justice Mosk argued, was on
equitable as well as ethical grounds best manifested by recognizing "that
every individual has a legally protectable property interest in his own body
and its products." 201 Justice Broussard was even more forceful with respect
to the issue of commodification:
The majority's rejection of plaintiff's conversion cause of action
does not mean that body parts may not be bought or sold . . . or that
no private individual may benefit economically from the fortuitous
value of plaintiff's diseased cells. Far from elevating these biologi-
cal cells above the market place, the majority's holding simply bars
plaintiff, the source of the cells, from obtaining the benefit of the
cells' value, but permits defendants, who allegedly obtained the
cells . . . by improper means, to retain and exploit the [cells'] full
economic value. 202
As with the question of the applicable theory of property, the justices on
both sides did not disagree on fundamental principles: the body is special,
and treating it as an ordinary good is problematic. But this agreement on the
dangers of commodification did not bring the justices into accord. In Justice
Arabian's view, respect for the unique nature of the human body counseled
against a grant of property rights, while the identical respect, in Justice
Mosk's view, counseled for a grant of property rights. Meanwhile, Justice
Broussard focused on the inevitability of commodification: the cells, he ar-
196. 793 P.2d at 497.
197. Id. at 498.
198. Id. at 497-98.
199. Id. at 498.
200. Id. at 515.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 506.
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gued, would be someone's property, and the only question was whose. Like
property theory, commodification theory provides no clear answers to own-
ership of the physical self, and is thus unlikely to lead to clear answers to
ownership of information about the self.
There is yet another way in which Moore sheds light on the possibilities
for using property as a vehicle to control personal information, and it de-
rives from Moore's posture with respect to his own tissues before he knew
that defendants had utilized them to form a commercially valuable cell line.
It seems unlikely that, on his own, Moore would have kept the cancerous
cells, enlarged spleen, or blood samples that were removed from his body;
how much use would they have seemed to him? Indeed, had the defendants
not developed a commercially-valuable product out of Moore's cells, it is
hard to imagine him asserting a conversion claim. How many of us, who
have had blood samples taken in a doctor's office or a hospital, or who have
donated blood, have thought of that blood as our "property"?2 03 Yet once
Moore understood that his tissue and cells had value in the hands of others,
"property" became a salient frame for him. In other words, the cells might
not have seemed "property" to him when they were withdrawn, but once he
saw their value as property to others, he saw his cells in a different way-
not as useless items for which he had no need, but as his property.204
The association between "value" and "property" is, of course, not one of
logical entailment; it is only after an asset has been recognized as legally pro-
tectable property that it will have commercial value.205 Yet, however naive,
203. Which is not to say that we do not think of it as "our" blood. We do. And we
would, for this reason, be angry if the laboratory to which the blood was sent mishandled
the blood, confusing "our" blood with another's. But we would not necessarily see the harm
of mishandling as a "property" problem.
204. This aspect of Moore's claim is somewhat obscured in the court's opinions by a
complicated and confusing discussion of what, exactly, made Moore's cells valuable. By the
time the case arose, the defendants had patented the cell line they had developed from Moore's
tissue and, since naturally occurring substances are not patentable, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980), the majority reasoned that the "property" in question must have derived
from something other than the raw materials Moore contributed. In the eyes of the majority,
the value of Moore's cells derived from the defendant's "incentive effort" in transforming
Moore's cells--effort that had to have been made for the patent to have lawfully issued. As the
majority put it, "Moore's allegations that he owns the cell line . .. are inconsistent with the
patent, which constitutes an authoritative determination that the cell line is the property of the
invention." 793 P.2d at 492. But the majority somewhat undermined this reasoning in another
part of its opinion where, to rebut the claim that Moore must have had an interest in his unique
genetic materials, it found that the lymphokines defendants had manufactured "have the same
molecular structure in every human being" and were not unique to Moore. Id. at 490.
205. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) ("[N]ot all
economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights' which
have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to
forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion."); Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 39 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Property, a creation of
law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a matter of fact. Many exchangeable
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Moore's claim seemed quite plausible to the dissenting justices. In rejecting
the majority's assertion that patients such as Moore would be sufficiently pro-
tected by disclosure of physicians' potentially-conflicting research interests,
Justice Broussard noted that the majority "fails even to mention the patient's
interest in obtaining the economic value, if any, that may adhere in the subse-
quent use of his own body parts."206 Justice Mosk made a similar point.
Responding to the argument that the tissue disposal statute had deprived
Moore of so many rights that no property remained in the bundle, Mosk
wrote that "Moore nevertheless retained valuable rights in that tissue. Above
all, at the time of its excision he at least had the right to do with his own
tissue whatever the defendants did with it."207 Both dissenting justices, then,
basically took the exact position that Moore did: that however little "proper-
ty" might have existed in these tissues before their commercial potential
became known, plenty of property existed afterwards.
There are obvious parallels between Moore's claims to property rights
in his excised tissue and claims to property rights in personal information.
Like Moore's cells, in our own hands our information doesn't seem much
like property. There is a lot of personal information about which, on our
own, we might not much care (did I use the ATM at the Market Square
shopping center or the ATM at the University?; did I weigh the same at my
last doctor's visit as I weigh today?; did I use Expedia or the US Airways
website to book my two most recent flights?). This isn't to say that some of
the information or its patterns might not be of interest; many people keep
close track of their cash flow each month, their weight, or their vacation
costs. But even when we pay attention, we might not be apt to characterize
our interest in information in terms of "ownership." But, as happened to
Moore, once we learn that others are capitalizing on information about us, it
becomes much easier to think of it as "ours," as "property" that others have
"taken" from us.
How are we to explain this shift in our characterization of these
"goods," the moment when property becomes salient? One explanation
would call upon what Radin calls the "domino theory,"208 under which "once
something is commodified for some it is willy-nilly commodified for every-
values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property depends upon exclu-
sion by law from interference.").
This point raises obvious issues well beyond the scope of this Article respecting the rela-
tionship between property and the state. The claim I make here is a limited one, which is that,
absent legal protection, individuals cannot reliably extract economic value from what they
might have otherwise considered "assets" because they cannot keep others from using those
assets.
206. 793 P.2d at 505. In Broussard's eyes, the patient would be entitled to that value
even if it constituted a "fortuitous 'windfall' " to the patient. Id.
207. Id. at 510. Mosk went on to note that "the majority cite no case holding that an
individual's right to develop and exploit the commercial potential of his own tissue is not a
right of sufficient worth or dignity to be deemed a protectable property interest." Id.
208. Radin, supra note 126, at 1909.
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one."20 The idea here is that the rhetoric of the market is difficult to control;
its introduction in one sphere (data aggregation and sale) may bleed into
other spheres, making it impossible for us to think of those other spheres in
non-commodified ways. 210 So, in Moore, once the defendants began to speak
of Moore's cells in terms of their commercial potential, it became impossi-
ble for Moore to think or speak of them in noncommercial terms. And so, in
terms of personal information, once we realize that others are already using
information about us in lucrative ways, it becomes impossible for us to think
or speak of that information except in terms of its market value.211 This
would be one way to understand how and why we see shifts from non-
property to property frames.
Another way to understand how and why we see such shifts is in terms
of property's "relativity." It is a widely accepted view of property, especially
under the bundle-of-rights view, that property rights can be relative, depend-
ent on the particular relationship between various parties. A standard
example is that of a prior possessor without proof of title-a finder-who is
considered to have a property right that would prevail against all later com-
ers, including bailees and thieves, but not against the true owner of the
found object.212 Something similar to this sort of thinking is illustrated in
Justice Broussard's dissent in Moore. Responding to the majority's argu-
ment that removed body parts could not be property for any purpose,
Broussard proposed a counter-factual:
If, for example, another medical center or drug company had stolen
all of the cells in question from the UCLA Medical Center laborato-
ry and had used them for its own benefit, there would be no
question but that a cause of action for conversion would properly lie
against the thief ... . Thus, the majority's analysis cannot rest on
the broad proposition that a removed body part is not property, but
rather rests on the proposition that a patient retains no ownership
interest in a body part once the body part has been removed from
his or her body. 2 13
Justice Mosk's argument-that Moore had "the right to do with his own
tissue whatever the defendants did with it"214 -iS consistent with what
seems to be Broussard's point. Perhaps for some purposes, we might deny
209. Id. at 1914.
210. Id.
211. The domino effect is not inevitable. Radin concedes that there are cases where the
introduction of the rhetoric of commodification might not lead to the inability to think of the
good in question in noncommodified ways. Id. She argues that "we should evaluate the dom-
ino theory on a case-by-case basis." Id.
212. See, e.g., Tapscott v. Lessee of Cobbs, 52 Va. 172 (11 Gratt. 172) (1854); Armory
v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
213. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 501 (Cal. 1990).
214. Id. at 510.
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that individuals own their tissue or their personal information. But with re-
spect to other persons claiming to own those individuals' bodily tissue or
information, the situation has changed; the individuals should have rights
just as good against the world as the commodifiers of their tissue or their
personal information might have.
Or perhaps the explanation of how property becomes salient derives
from something as simple as envy. If a child who otherwise despises dolls
and who is happily playing with paints asserts after she sees her brother
begin to play with a neglected Raggedy Ann that the doll is "mine," we are
not surprised. But it is not only children who, when they see others making
use of what they themselves have ignored, discover an appetite to use the
thing themselves-or at least get some compensation for its use. On this
theory, property rights in personal information seem appropriate just
when-and just because-others are seen to have them.2 1 5
However property frames might arise, they come at a cost. Once Moore
conceptualized his interest in terms of property, he rather quickly jumped to
the conclusion that he had the power to control the use of his tissue.216 As
with value, the connection between property and control is not one of logi-
cal entailment; owners are not in fact free to do just whatever they like with
their property. 217 But again, lest Moore's claim be dismissed as naive, it
should be noted that a critical part of Justice Broussard's dissent was based
on his belief that the majority's informed-consent and breach of fiduciary
duty theory would not provide the kind or degree of control provided by
conversion. 218 Once property enters the picture, it is all too easy to believe
215. This might be one perspective through which to view a case such as Sorrell v. IMS,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). In any physician's individual hands, her prescribing data was not
worth much; aggregated in the hands of commercial entities, the data was extremely valuable
for marketing purposes-purposes the legislature later sought to proscribe in the statute at
issue in the case.
The children's toy analogy makes the problem of the property frame both vivid and
accessible, but the analogy should not be pushed too far. In the cases of both John Moore and
Henrietta Lacks, there were elements of deceit by physicians of patients who had no way to
know of the use being made of their cells. and the wrong in these cases is in this sense some-
what different than that experienced by the sister in the doll hypothetical. But in Moore, the
patient claimed not only lack of informed consent and violation of fiduciary duty--claims
based on deceit-but also conversion-a claim based on property.
216. "Moore ... theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal
from his body, at least for the purpose of directing their use[.]" 793 P.2d at 487.
217. Even fee owners' rights are limited by common law duties of reasonable use, by
locally imposed zoning restrictions, and by easements and servitudes, just to name a few lim-
its on owners' control powers. And of course non-fee owners such as tenants have even less
control. As is developed infra text accompanying notes 259-262, unconstrained power-total
control-is the exception, not the rule.
218. Judge Broussard wrote:
As a general matter, the tort of conversion protects an individual . . . against unau-
thorized use of his property or improper interference with his right to control the
use of his property. . . . [Tihe complaint alleges that, before the body part was re-
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that control ineluctably follows. As the next Part explains, this vision is as
misleading as it is seductive.
III. INFORMATION'S FUTURE
For most of this Article, I have treated medical information as but a sub-
set, a distinct category, of information generally. My argument has been that
medical and other information is in at least one important way alike: it is
information over which individuals seek control. It is control, I have argued,
that has led to calls for the propertization of information.
In Section A of this Part, I survey some of the problems particular to
health information. The survey does not purport to be complete. Its purpose
is to highlight just a few of the many important health policy issues raised
by the digitization of medical information. Even a cursory view of such is-
sues suggests that the common law of property will be inadequate to cope
with the many-faceted problems that arise with respect to digitized medical
information. The solutions, if there are solutions, are more likely to be de-
veloped legislatively and administratively, and to be finely tailored to
address a wide variety of distinct problems. While patients may be given
some powers over the information collected about them, it is unlikely that
those powers will look much like property in any of the senses in which that
term is conventionally used.
In Section B, I suggest that the solution to the larger problem of infor-
mation control also lies in legislation and regulation. Barely a day goes by
that we do not read of catastrophic breaches of data security. If banks, credit
card companies, cell phone carriers, and even the mighty Google cannot
safeguard our personal information, surely at some point Congress will be
pressured to act. Europe has already done so. We cannot know whether the
resulting legislation will be effective in actually securing personal infor-
mation. It will, however, be important expressively, evidencing public
concern over uncontrolled disclosures of private information. Here again,
property will play only a bit part in the solution.
In Section C, I argue that, in the context of information, property talk
can mislead. At least some of the arguments for property rights in infor-
mation rely on a somewhat simplistic association between property and
"dominion." But even with respect to physical assets, property often gives
owners far less control than is conventionally recognized. Indeed, the extent
to which property implies control is deeply debated within property theory.
In our increasingly interconnected world, we need to make difficult choices
about how power and control should be allocated-and, most likely,
moved, defendants intentionally withheld material information that ... was neces-
sary for his exercise of control over the body part.
793 P.2d at 502.
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shared-among a variety of parties. The concept of "property" alone cannot
tell us how to make those choices.
A. The Peculiar Problems of Medical/Health Information
Medical information presents some unique policy challenges. The ad-
vantages of digitization require widespread adoption of EHRs, which must
be made interoperable if they are to have the network effects that would lead
to widespread improvement of outcomes. But adoption is expensive219 and it
is disruptive. 220 Interoperability requires standardization of data collection
and interchange protocols. 221 And network effects require interconnection
and coordination. 222 The market itself has not produced these "goods." 223 if
it had, it would be hard to explain the creation of subsidies for EHR adop-
tion,2 4 the appointment of a National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology within the Department of Health and Human Services, 225 and
the use of such entities as the Institute of Medicine to formulate recommen-
dations as to EHR use.226
Widespread adoption, if achieved, would create a raft of other issues.
Will providers be liable for the errors of others who participate in the crea-
tion of a medical record? 227 For their own data input errors? 228 For failure to
219. Hall, supra note 7, at 639 (reporting cost estimates of $100 to $300 billion for a
complete, nationwide system); Adam Seth Litwin, Why Don't Docs Digitize? The Adoption of
Health Information Technology in Primary Care Medicine (Soc. Sci. Research Network,
Paper No. 1431202, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1431202 (suggesting that even direct subsidies will not promote adoption unless physi-
cians can share in the saving generated by ERH adoption).
220. Richard J. Baron et al., Electronic Health Records: Just Around the Corner? Or
Over the Cliff?, 143 ANN. INTERN. MED. 222, 223-25 (2005) (describing the training, work-
redesign, and financial burdens of EHR adoption).
221. See, e.g., Nancy Ferris, Electronic Health Record Standards, HEALTH POLICY
BRIEF, Sep. 28, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/
briefpdfs/healthpolicybrief 26.pdf ("Another key goal is to make certain that data collected
by one system is compatible with data collected by another.").
222. Hall, supra note 7, at 638.
223. Id. at 636 (describing "market failures" that led to government intervention).
224. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 18.
225. In 2004, the Bush administration established the position of the National Coordina-
tor for Health Information Technology in DHHS. See Laura Landro, The Infonned Patient:
Electronic Medical Records Are Taking Root Locally, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2004, at D7;
Steve Lohr, Government Wants to Bring Health Records into Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2004, at C4; see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 21, at 3; Farzad Mostashari, MD,
ScM, National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, OFF. OF THE NAT'L
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/
farzad-mostashari-md-scm (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
226. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 18.
227. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and
Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1524, 1542-44 (2009).
228. Id. at 1544-45.
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read the entire longitudinal record before making recommendations? 2 9 For
failing to properly follow security protocols? 23 0
And what is the status of the information in EHRs? Many of the benefits
of digitization contemplate the aggregation of data in multiple records. The
data could then be used to improve public health, by identifying, for exam-
ple, what percentage of patients experience adverse reactions to a specific
drug, or how patients respond to alternative therapies. 231 But the aggregation
of data and its use for public health purposes raise their own issues. Must
the data in each record be "de-identified" and, if so, what is the best way to
do so?232 Should the data be considered a public good that should be owned
by the public? 233 Should patients be able to opt out of data aggregation? 234
These questions do not begin to exhaust the field of issues raised. 235
They do, however, illustrate the breadth of problems to be confronted, and
the number of technical issues that will have to be addressed, if EHRs are to
achieve their potential to change the delivery of health care. Even a cursory
examination of the issues suggests that generally speaking they are not ame-
nable to resolution by adjudication under common law property principles.
Such principles tell us nothing about protocols for information exchange,
de-identification, or aggregation. The will to set standards, and the expertise
to set them effectively, must come from Congress or, more likely, the admin-
istrative agencies charged with delivering and paying for health care
services.
EHRs are, after all, health records, and thus raise issues of health poli-
cy. With respect to these issues, it is not clear that "property" as a legal
category has much to add. Let us assume for a moment that patients do have
property rights in their medical information and that that right affords them
some degree of control over the data in their EHRs. We might then decide as
a policy matter that patients should have some powers over the data in their
files, such that they could either access that data or have a voice in its use by
229. Id. at 1537-42.
230. As noted supra text accompanying note 45, one complaint about HIPAA is that it
does not provide a private right of action.
231. On the public health benefits of EHRs, see Rodwin, supra note 7; Rodwin, supra
note 29.
232. On deidentification, see Rothstein, supra note 4; see also KHALED EL EMAM ET
AL., THE CASE FOR DE-IDENTIFYING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1744038.
233. Rodwin, supra note 7, at 86, 88.
234. Evans, supra note 7, at 96. If patients could freely opt out of data aggregation, their
individual control/veto rights could pose the danger of a health information anti-commons.
Rodwin, supra note 7.
235. For example, how should employers treat data in EHRs? See Sharona Hoffman,
Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN.
J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 409, 410-12 (2010) (surveying the issues that EHRs raise for employers).
Should the data be made available to law enforcement officials? See 45 C.F.R.
164.512(f)(2010) (permitting disclosure of health information to law enforcement officials
under specified circumstances).
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others. It is nonetheless likely that patients' control rights would have to be
highly qualified to account for, inter alia, the needs of system operability or
the government's interest in public health. The solution to the myriad health
policy problems that EHRs present is likely to involve numerous finely-
grained rules focused on particularized problems. In the end, patients will
have those powers-and only those powers-that are consistent with the
other needs of a workable health system. Maybe those powers will resemble
the powers we associate with "ownership" of "property," and maybe they
won't. If they do, the category "property" will have had little to do with the
matter. Health, reimbursement, and technical imperatives will all be more
determinative.
B. The More General Problem of Personal Information
Not all personal information implicates exactly the same health, reim-
bursement, and technical issues presented by EHRs. But, as with medical
information in particular, personal information is subject to a variety of con-
flicting forces and policy imperatives. On the one side, information is big
business, and attempts to regulate its collection wholesale are likely to en-
counter significant resistance. 236 On the other side, each week brings a new
story of information in danger-of systems breached or hacked; of credit
card and social security numbers no longer secured.2 3 7 The pressure to do
something to protect personal information can only grow.
236. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1547-48 (arguing that well-financed collector/users of
private information will work hard to block efforts to give property rights to individuals).
237. A breach at CardSystems Solutions, a company that processes more than fifteen
billion dollars in credit card payments, exposed more than forty million credit card accounts
of all brands. Citigroup lost nearly four million unencrypted consumer records stored on mag-
netic computer tapes during a shipment to a credit-reporting agency. Eric Dash & Tom Zeller,
Jr., Mastercard Says 40 Million Files are Put at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al. An-
other processing company, Heartland Payment Systems, suffered a breach potentially
exposing tens of millions of credit and debit cardholders to the risk of fraud. Eric Dash &
Brad Stone, Big Breach In Card Data Raises Risk For Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at
B4. The names, birth dates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 2.6 million veterans
were exposed to identity theft when an intruder stole electronic data from a VA analyst's
home in 2006. See Christopher Lee, Veterans Angered by File Scandal, WASH. POST, May 24,
2006, at A2 1; Hope Yen, VA Didn't Alert FBI for 2 Weeks after Data Heist, CHI. TRIB., May
24, 2006, at C4.
Epsilon, an online marketer that manages customer databases and email marketing for
about 2,500 companies, suffered an unauthorized entry into its customer database, one of the
largest database breaches in U.S. history. Though no financial information was compromised.,
the email information obtained could be used for "phishing," in which fraudulent e-mails
request customers' account numbers, Social Security numbers, etc. See Email-Theft Victims
Still Coining to Light, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2011, at C26; James Covert, Massive E-Breach
Targets Consumers, N.Y. PosT, Apr. 4, 2011, at 25.
The Department of Health and Human Services posts breaches of unsecured protected
health information affecting more than five hundred individuals on their website. See U.S.




Europe has tackled the problem of controlling information by legisla-
tion. In 1995, the European Union issued its Directive on the Privacy of
Personal Data 95/46/EC ("the Directive"). 238 The specifics of the Directive
are well beyond the scope of this Article, and already there are proposals for
its revision. 239 Very roughly, the Directive sets objectives for handling per-
sonal data,240 including fair and legal processing,24 1 collecting and using data
for "specified, explicit, and legitimate" purposes,24 2 and maintaining accu-
rate and complete records.24 3 Processing under the Directive is narrowly
constricted to when the data subject, the person to whom the information
relates, gives unambiguous consent,244 or specific instances of necessity.
245
Certain "special categories" of data24 6 are afforded additional protection, and
this sensitive data is prohibited from being processed,247 with few excep-
tions. 248
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2012). In general, there were so many data breaches in 2011 that some
commentators refer to 2011 as the "Year of the Data Breach." See Michael P. Voelker, After
'Year of the Data Breach,' Carriers Increase Capacity, Competition for Cyber Risks, PROP.
CASUALTY 3600 (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2012/02/02/after-year-
of-the-data-breach-carriers-increase-ca?t=commercial.
238. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 31995L0046:en:HTML [hereinafter
Directive].
239. Rebecca Wong, Data Protection: The Future of Privacy, 27 COMPUTER L. & SEC.
REV. 1-5 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=101
2&
context=rebecca.wong&sei-redir- I #search=%2220 11 +revision+to+95/46/EC%22.
240. Directive, supra note 238, at art. 6.
241. Id. at art. 6(1)(a). Processing is defined as "any operation or set of operations which
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, re-
cording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure
by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
blocking, erasure or destruction." Id. at art. 2(b).
242. Id. at art. 6(l)(b).
243. Id. at art. 6(l)(d).
244. Id. at art. 7(a).
245. See id. at art. 7 (stating that instances of necessity include: creation or performance
of a contract involving the data subject, compliance with a legal obligation, protection of data
subject's vital interests, performance of a task in the public interest or with official authority,
or legitimate interests of the controller or third party that override the interests of the data
subject).
246. Id. at art. 8(l) (including information that reveals "racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership," and information regard-
ing one's health or sex-life).
247. Id.
248. Id. at art. 8 (exceptions include: data subject gives explicit consent, processing is
necessary for obligations and rights in the field of employment law or to protect "vital inter-
ests" of the data subject, processing is done as a legitimate activity of an association and
relates solely to the members of that association, or processing relates to data the data subject
makes public or to a legal claim).
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Europe and America differ in many important respects in their attitudes
toward and cultures of information.249 The First Amendment alone might
make Americans more suspicious than Europeans of the very idea of re-
strictions on information processing.2 50 Putting this suspicion to one side,
American regulation of information might differ from the Directive's provi-
sions in many specific respects.
That said, it is hard to deny the appeal of a legislative solution to the
problem of personal information, a solution that-like the Directive-
attempts to be comprehensive and to unify the law. Sooner or later it seems
likely that the U.S. will be pressured to move in this direction. As noted ear-
lier, Congress has already enacted piecemeal legislation addressing narrow
categories of information. 251 But the recent information-loss scandals range
broadly, touching banks, mobile phone companies, and Google.2 52 At some
point, the problem will cry out for comprehensive resolution.
As with medical records, that resolution will need to encompass a num-
ber of interests: individuals care about nondisclosure of facts deemed
sensitive, institutions care about the financial and practical burdens of pro-
tecting data, and the government cares about access to information it regards
as necessary for national security or other "public" purposes. 253 Though po-
249. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. I151 (2004) (contrasting American and European cultures of privacy).
250. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedon of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou-
bling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049
(2000).
251. See Terry, supra note 33.
252. See, e.g., Dash & Stone, supra note 237. Apple and Google both have had recent
incidences of security breaches. The AT&T network that supports Apple iPhones and iPads
devices was hacked in 2010, exposing an estimated I 14,000 user e-mail addresses. See Cecilia
Kang, Post Tech: Security Tech Exposes iPad Infonnation, WASH. PosT, June 10, 2010, at
All ; Miguel Helft, AT&T Said to Expose iPad Users' Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010,
at B2. Google's popular Gmail system has been successfully breached. See Jason Arrington,
Google Reveals Data Security Breach on Gmail, CRYPTZONE (June 2, 2011),
http://www.cryptzone.com/news/article.aspx?category=Email-security&title=Google-reveals-
data-security-breach-on-Gmail&id=800565910.
253. Passed just six weeks after the September eleventh attacks, the USA PATRIOT
Act was implemented in response to the national security crisis but has been criticized as
being overly broad and weakening privacy protections by, in many cases, eliminating the
requirement that investigators show probable cause for collecting personal information. See,
e.g., Derek M. Alphran, Changing Tides: A Lesser Expectation of Privacy in a Post 9//l
World, 13 RicH. J.L. & Pun. INT. 89 (2009) (arguing that despite the lack of recent immediate
known terrorist threats, the "war on terror" has made invasions of privacy in public and pri-
vate places an accepted norm); Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 436 (2008) (asserting that claims that more
government access to information could have prevented the September eleventh attacks has
fueled an "apparently insatiable government appetite for access to and retention of personal
data, especially from the vast databases routinely maintained by the private sector"); Kelly R.
Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave Enough to Maintain Civil Liberties
in the Face of Terrorist Induced Trauma, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 55 (2003) (alleging that
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tential future legislation will be comprehensive in the sense of addressing a
wider array of information problems than current statutes, it is also likely-as
in the case of legislation relating to medical information-to present fine-
grained, context-dependent rules. For example, we may have the right to keep
our mobile phone carriers-but not the government-from making or keeping
records of our location based on the GPS capacities of our phones.2' Again,
let us for a moment assume, as we did with respect to medical information,
that individuals do have property rights in personal information and that those
rights afford them some degree of control over data pertaining to them. It
does not follow that the powers that individuals gain or retain from compre-
hensive information-protection legislation will look like conventional
property rights. Instead, the powers are likely to be significantly curtailed to
accommodate other competing interests at issue. If by some chance the
powers afforded to individuals do look like property rights, it will be be-
cause individual control does not threaten institutional and governmental
concerns, not because "property" demands any particular solution.
C. W(h)ither Property?
I have suggested in this Part that the legal category "property" will not de-
termine individuals' rights to control their medical information specifically or
their personal information generally-that health- and information-specific
policies will determine how many, and what kind of, powers individuals will
have with respect to information. In making these suggestions, I do not mean
to argue that property has altogether lost its meaning, integrity, or coherence
as a legal category. 255 I mean instead to challenge the connection that is fun-
damental to arguments for propertization of information, the connection
between property and control.
Recall that property "solves" the problem of information control by giv-
ing owners veto power over the use of their personal information. If
individuals "own" their information, then they-and only they-can control
though the purpose of the Patriot Act was to prevent terrorism, some provisions grant overly
broad surveillance powers that extend beyond preventing terrorism).
254. Apple and Google have used their products to breach customers' security. Apple
used Wi-Fi access points and cell tower locations to track iPhone and iPad users' locations,
storing the unencrypted information on the Apple device and users' computers upon synchro-
nization, making the information vulnerable to hacking. See Miguel Helft, Jobs Concedes
Apple's Mistakes, and Promises a Fix on Location Data Practice, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2011,
at B3; iSpy: Your iPhone Knows Where You've Been, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 2011, at C3; David
Sarno, Apple Denies Tracking iPhones, L.A. TIMES, April 28, 2011, at BI. Google used its
Android phones to collect data on Wi-Fi hot spots, enhance its mapping features, and provide
marketing based on users' locations. Miguel Helft, Phone Data Used to Fill Digital Map,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at BI; Yukari Iwatani Kane, House Panel Widens Inquiry Into
Tracking to More Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2011, at B3.
255. Cf. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Nomos XXII: PROPERTY
68, 81-82 (J. Roland Pennock & John w. Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that property has
ceased to be an important category in legal and political theory).
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if and under what circumstances that information is used. But just as argu-
ments about propertization of information make simplified assumptions about
property's alienability, this argument makes simplified assumptions about the
connection between ownership and control.
If all property rights were rights to exclude, then the relationship be-
tween ownership and control would be relatively uncomplicated. In rein
exclusion rights can be understood as a sort of delegation of powers that
"allows owners to undertake the choice among uses without having to justi-
fy the decision to third parties."25 6 There is serious disagreement among
property theorists over the question of whether exclusion is central to prop-
erty law,257 but, tellingly, there is agreement that not all property rights are
rights to exclude.258 Trespass is important to property, but so is nuisance.
In many of the arguments for propertization, the "owner" of information
is depicted as exercising something very like Blackstone's infamous "des-
potic dominion" over what is hers.259 She does or does not decide to keep
information secret; she does or does not agree to various proposed contracts
with respect to her information; she does or does not give website owners
freedom to make unfettered use of whatever they glean from her activity on
their sites. But putting aside the information issues that might distort these
decisions, the underlying vision of ownership-as-freedom does not conform
to reality. Even physical property is far less amenable to consolidated con-
trol than is sometimes thought. Most ownership rights are qualified: zoning
limits the ability of fee simple owners to do whatever they want on their
land; the revolution in landlord-tenant law has led to new rules that limit
landlords' freedom of action with respect to leased property in numerous
ways; covenants and easements impose still other restrictions on owners'
ability to do whatever they might like on their own land. Where property is
owned in common, co-owners owe each other a variety of duties, and con-
trol rights are shared. From environmental law to occupancy limits, federal,
state, and local statutes constrain owners' powers in significant respects.
256. Smith, supra note 83, at 984; see also Smith, supra note 98, at 1728 ("Property
responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses together and delegating to the owner the
choice of how to use the asset.").
257. See Baron, supra note 85, at 919-20.
258. As noted supra text accompanying notes 101-105, those who put exclusion at the
core of property nonetheless see a role for more complex "governance" rules. See, e.g., Mer-
rill & Smith, supra note 81, at 797-98; see also Smith, supra note 87, manuscript at 9
("exclusion is not the whole story").
259. On Blackstone's infamous statement describing property as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the rights of any other individual in the universe," 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *2, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety,
108 YALE LJ. 601, 602 (1998) (asserting that "Blackstone posed his definition more as a
metaphor than as a literal description-and as a slightly anxiety-provoking metaphor at that").
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In the eyes of some theorists, these limits are exceptional; 26 in the eyes
of others, these limits are the norm.26' Either way, property does not always
or necessarily entail control. The contrary is also true, as substantial control
rights can exist without ownership.26 2 In the end, property is sometimes
power, but not always. Within property law and theory, the extent to which
ownership gives rise to any particular form of control is a matter of contro-
versy, and today's resolution of that question may not be the same as its
resolution at another time. Information doesn't tell a new story about con-
trol; it merely updates an old one.
We can call information "property" if we want to, but, as with alienabil-
ity, we will still have to decide exactly how much control individuals can
exert, and under precisely what circumstances. These are hard questions.
The digitization of medical information, with its proliferation of potential
owners and its multiplication of relationships among those owners, makes
the hard question of how much control any individual can have even harder.
But to answer that question we will need to do more than simply invoke the
category "property." No legal category can define itself. Whether we decide
to give individuals "property" rights in their personal information or not, we
will have to make hard choices about how power and authority-control-
will be shared in a world of increasing interconnection.
CONCLUSION
One explanation of why property seems such a promising avenue for
control of personal information relates to the limits of language. As Julie
Cohen notes, "private" means "not common-owned, and set apart from that
which is common and owned by others."2 63 Things that are not owned, in
contrast, "are presumptively accessible to all."2" As we have seen, what we
want with respect to personal information is control. But "we lack a word
for describing control over things without legal or beneficial ownership of
them-a word that signifies that the thing described is both not common and
not owned."2 65 For lack of a word, we try another-property-because we
simply can't help ourselves.
This Article has argued that however natural it may be to talk about in-
formation control in property terms, it is also misleading. Issues of whether
property is centered around exclusion, involves consolidated rights, operates
in rem, or requires standardized forms are all issues about the extent to
260. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 81, at 79; Smith, supra note 98, at 1755-58.
261. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 118, at 1052-53. For a summary of this debate, see
Baron, supra note 85, at 945-52.
262. One can, for example, control the use of property one does not own through ease-
ments and servitudes.
263. Cohen, supra note 6, at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 1379.
265. Id. at 1379.
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which property gives individuals control over what they own. Because the
degree to which property grants control is itself fundamentally contested
within property law and theory, "property" cannot tell us how much control
individuals should have over their medical or personal information.
In the end, there is no consensus that the attenuated control that can re-
alistically be asserted in the context of personal information is appropriately
called "property" at all. Nor is there consensus on whether the rhetoric of
property points us toward or away from the values at play when the "good"
in question is some aspect of our very "selves." Finally, if there is "proper-
ty" in information, it may be a very unappealing kind of property-a claim
derived from envy of the value that others have found in what we had ig-
nored or thought worthless.
Controlling information of all kinds requires hard choices. Individuals
legitimately worry about what the world might come to know about them
and how the world might come to know it. But individuals' concerns are but
one part of a very large equation. With respect to EHRs, that equation in-
cludes, inter alia, considerations of health policy and public health. With
respect to personal information more generally, the equation includes, inter
alia, financial, national security, and free speech concerns. Individuals no
doubt should be granted some power to control their personal information.
But the concept of property alone cannot tell us how much, or what kind, of
power. This uncertainty is not new, and it is not necessarily problematic. In a
world that is ever more interconnected, power and control will inevitably be
shared.
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